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ABSTRACT
Essays on the Impacts of Environmental Regulation on Firm Behavior
by
Nicholas E. Powers
Chair: Thomas P. Lyon
My dissertation is composed of three papers that examine the effects of environmental
policies as they relate to firms’ decisions. The challenge of crafting environmental
policies that achieve their environmental goals without placing an unnecessary burden
on the firms that drive economic growth is becoming increasingly acute as concerns
over global warming and other environmental issues continue to grow. All three papers
in my dissertation examine effects of relatively new approaches to environmental
regulation that attempt to accomplish this task.
In the first paper, I analyze the effects of a pollution disclosure and rating program,
run by a non-governmental organization in India, on the environmental performance
of the country’s largest pulp and paper mills. I find that this program drove sig-
nificant reductions in pollution loadings among dirty plants but not among cleaner
ones, and that plants located in wealthier communities were more responsive to these
ratings, as were single-plant firms. These findings shed light on the conditions un-
der which information-based regulation may prove effective in improving industrial
environmental performance.
In the second paper, I provide the most rigorous empirical analysis to date of the
ix
effectiveness of renewable portfolio standards (RPS), which are state-level policies
designed to promote investment in renewable electric generating capacity. I introduce
a new measure for the stringency of an RPS that explicitly accounts for several
important dimensions of RPS heterogeneity. My econometric analysis of state-level
panel data suggests that RPS policies have had a significant and positive effect on
in-state renewable energy development.
In my third paper, I return to the topic of disclosure, though this time the program
I analyze is a government-run program in the United States. In particular, I use
unique establishment-level Census micro data to examine how potential entrants’
entry decisions changed in response to the creation of the Toxics Release Inventory. I
find that on average, counties that were found to be among the dirtiest in the country
experienced a decrease in ”dirty” plant births and an even larger increase in ”clean”
plant births. Furthermore, the magnitude of this shift is closely related to per capita




This dissertation is composed of three distinct papers that all examine the inci-
dence of different environmental policies representing novel approaches to environ-
mental regulation. The economic impacts of environmental regulation have been an
important research topic since the dawn of the modern environmental policy move-
ment in the mid-20th century, as economists have attempted to answer the question
of whether the fixes to the market failures that environmental policies are intended
to correct have an overall positive impact. In the last three decades, however, new
forms of environmental regulation, requiring new analysis and study, have emerged.
Each paper in my dissertation examines one of these new approaches; I provide a
short summary of each paper below.
The first paper examines a non-traditional form of environmental regulation from a
non-traditional source - a non-governmental organization. Public disclosure programs
that collect and disseminate information about firms’ environmental performance are
increasingly popular in both developed and developing countries. Yet little is known
about whether they actually improve environmental performance, particularly in the
latter setting. I use detailed plant-level survey data to evaluate the impact of India’s
Green Rating Project (GRP) on the environmental performance of the country’s
largest pulp and paper plants. I find that the GRP drove significant reductions
1
in pollution loadings among dirty plants but not among cleaner ones. This result
comports with statistical and anecdotal evaluations of similar disclosure programs. I
also find that plants located in wealthier communities were more responsive to GRP
ratings, as were single-plant firms.
My second paper examines a regulatory policy that is more traditional in that
it is administered by state governments, but most often relies on the relatively new
approach of market mechanisms to achieve its environmental goals. Several states
have passed renewable portfolio standard policies in order to encourage investment
in renewable energy technologies, but little is known about their effectiveness. In
this paper I present the most rigorous statistical analysis of these policies to date,
allowing the impact of the policies to vary with the heterogeneity in their design. I
find that RPS policies do in fact lead to a statistically significant increase in renewable
electricity development, but that much of the increase in renewable development can
be explained by other factors. I also introduce a new measure that more accurately
captures the stringency of state-level RPS policies, and demonstrate how crucial the
measurement of RPS stringency is for this type of policy analysis.
My final paper also deals with a U.S. context, but returns to the question of
whether public disclosure of pollution is sufficient to induce polluters to alter their
behavior. The Toxics Release Inventory was the first major initiative to take a
disclosure-based approach to environmental regulation and has served as the model
for several other disclosure-based environmental policies. Yet the magnitude of its
direct impacts, whether on improvements in environmental quality or on firm efforts
to abate pollution, has not been established, due to data shortcomings and other
concurrent policy changes. This proposed research project will permit better identi-
fication of some of the impacts of both the Toxics Release Inventory and the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990 on establishment-level pollution control efforts.
2
CHAPTER II
Does Disclosure Reduce Pollution? Evidence from
India’s Green Rating Project1
2.1 Introduction
Programs that collect and disseminate information about firms’ environmental
performance have been characterized as the “third wave” in environmental regulation,
after command-and-control and market-based approaches (Tietenberg, 1998). Two
types of national public disclosure programs have emerged over the past two decades
(Dasgupta et al., 2007). So-called pollutant release transfer registries simply report
emissions or discharge data without using them to rate or otherwise characterize
environmental performance. More than 20 countries have set up such registries.2
The second type of national public disclosure program both reports emissions
or discharge data and uses them to rate plants’ environmental performance. These
programs are confined to developing countries and focus mostly on conventional pol-
lutants. Examples include Indonesia’s Program for Pollution Control, Evaluation,
1The material in this chapter represents joint work with Allen Blackman, Thomas Lyon, and
Urvashi Narain.
2Countries that have at least the inception of a web-accessible pollution release transfer registry
include Austria, Australia, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, England, France, Ger-
many, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Scotland, South Korea, Spain, and
Sweden, and the United States (Dasgupta et al., 2007; Kerret and Gray, 2007). Like the seminal
U.S. Toxic Release Inventory, most focus on toxic pollutants not covered by conventional regulations.
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and Rating (PROPER), which was the first such program to appear and is the best
known; India’s Green Rating Project; the Philippines’ EcoWatch program; China’s
GreenWatch program; and Vietnam’s Black and Green Books initiative. These pro-
grams have been touted as a means of circumventing perhaps the most daunting
obstacle to pollution control in developing countries: weak environmental regulatory
institutions. Public disclosure does not necessarily require an effective enforcement
capability or even a well-defined set of environmental regulations. Furthermore, the
costs of the administrative activities it does require – data collection and dissemina-
tion – are declining thanks to new information technologies (Dasgupta et al. (2007)).
Notwithstanding the promise and growing popularity of public disclosure, we know
little about whether it actually improves environmental performance, in either indus-
trialized or developing countries. As discussed in the next section, most evaluations
to date have been anecdotal, and only a few rigorous analyses have appeared.
To help fill this gap, this paper evaluates the impact of India’s Green Rating
Project (GRP) on the environmental performance of the country’s largest pulp and
paper plants. To our knowledge, it is the first rigorous analysis of the GRP’s envi-
ronmental impact and only the second such evaluation of a developing country public
disclosure program.3 To identify the effect of the GRP, we control for other factors
that drive cross-sectional and intertemporal variations in pollutant discharges using
exceptionally detailed plant-level data, including both primary survey and secondary
census data.
Our analysis suggests that the GRP drove significant reductions in pollution load-
ings among dirty plants but not among cleaner ones. This result comports with sta-
tistical and anecdotal evaluations of similar disclosure programs (Dasgupta et al.,
2007; Garćıa et al., 2007, 2009). We also find that plants in wealthier communities
were more responsive to GRP ratings, as were single-plant firms.
3To the best of our knowledge, the only other developing country program that has been rigorously
evaluated is the PROPER program; see Garćıa et al. (2007) and Garćıa et al. (2009) for details.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature
on public disclosure and presents a conceptual framework for our empirical analysis.
Section 3 provides background information on the GRP and the Indian pulp and
paper industry. Section 4 describes the empirical framework and the data used in
the regression analysis. Section 5 presents our econometric results, and Section 6
concludes.
2.2 Literature Review and Conceptual Framework
This section briefly reviews the empirical literature on public disclosure programs,
focusing on two questions: do they improve environmental performance, and if so,
how? Then, drawing on the literature, it presents a heuristic graphical model of
public disclosure to underpin the econometric analysis.
2.2.1 Does Public Disclosure Improve Environmental Performance?
Only a few papers have evaluated environmental performance rating programs
like the GRP, but all have concluded that the programs have generated environmen-
tal benefits. Of these papers, to our knowledge, only two – Garćıa et al. (2007)
and Garćıa et al. (2009) – present a rigorous statistical analysis. Using panel data on
both participants and nonparticipants, the authors test whether Indonesias PROPER
drove reductions in water pollution. They find that the program in fact spurred signif-
icant emissions reductions, particularly among plants with poor compliance records.
Dasgupta et al. (2007) present a largely qualitative evaluation of performance rating
programs in Indonesia, the Philippines, China, and Vietnam. In each program, the
authors find that a large number of plants initially rated “noncompliant” improved
to “compliant” over time (although plants rated “flagrant violators” and “compli-
ant” tended to remain in these categories). Without additional statistical analysis,
however, one cannot determine whether public disclosure or exogenous changes in
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technological, regulatory, or market conditions were responsible for the apparent in-
crease in compliance. Wang et al. (2004) provide a more detailed but still primarily
anecdotal evaluation of the Chinese performance ratings program that suggests it
succeeded in improving environmental performance.
Several recent papers evaluate public disclosure initiatives other than environmen-
tal performance rating programs and also find significant impacts on environmental
performance. Bennear and Olmstead (2008) find that a 1996 amendment to the
U.S. Safe Drinking Water Act, mandating that community drinking water systems
publicly report regulatory violations, reduced the incidence of subsequent violations.
Similarly, Delmas et al. (2007) find that regulations requiring U.S. electric utilities
to mail bill inserts to consumers reporting the extent of their reliance on fossil fuels
led to a significant decrease in fossil fuel use. And Foulon et al. (2002) find that a
policy of publicly disclosing the identity of plants that are non-compliant or “of con-
cern” spurred emissions reductions in a sample of pulp and paper plants in British
Columbia.
Finally, a number of papers have examined the U.S. Toxic Release Inventory
(Konar and Cohen, 1996; Khanna and Anton, 2002; Bui, 2005; Koehler and Spengler,
2007). Since the program began in 1986, total reported releases of the toxics it covers
have fallen by at least 45%. However, it is not clear that public disclosure has been
responsible for this decline. Data on toxic releases are not available for the period
preceding the program, or for plants that fall outside the program, and as a result
the usual means of estimating releases absent the program are not available (Bennear
and Olmstead, 2008).4
4Moreover, several papers propose alternative explanations for the observed reductions in toxic
releases, including the imposition of more stringent conventional regulation (Bui, 2005); plants
practice of substituting unlisted toxics for listed ones (Greenstone, 2003); and simple underreporting
of emissions (Koehler and Spengler, 2007).
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2.2.2 How might public disclosure improve environmental performance?
Tietenberg (1998) identifies seven channels through which public disclosure may
motivate improved environmental performance. To simplify the exposition, we group
these channels into four broad categories.
• Output market pressures. Disclosure may affect the demand for firms’ goods.
• Input market pressures. Disclosure may affect the demand for firms’ securities
and the firms’ ability to hire and retain employees.
• Judicial pressures. Disclosure may encourage private citizens to initiate tort
law actions against polluters, motivate private suits to force firms to undertake
abatement, and give rise to judicial actions in countries whose constitutions
guarantee citizens the right to a healthy environment (as in India).
• Regulatory pressures. Disclosure may build support for new pollution control
legislation or better enforcement of existing legislation.
Based on the literature discussed below, we add two more mechanisms.
• Community pressures. Disclosure may enhance pressures that community groups
and nongovernmental organizations place on polluters to cut their discharges.
• Managerial information. Disclosure may provide new information to managers
about their plants’ discharges and options for reducing them.
Empirical analysis aimed at determining which of those six mechanisms explain how
various public disclosure programs have their effect is limited. To our knowledge,
only a few empirical papers have examined this issue as it relates to performance
rating programs, like the GRP and PROPER. Gupta and Goldar (2005) test whether
GRP ratings affect the stock prices of Indian companies in the pulp and paper, chlor
alkali, and automobile sectors (three of the four sectors rated by the GRP, the other
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being cement, which was rated after 2005). They find that poor GRP ratings led to
significant negative abnormal returns. These results suggest that GRP may have an
important effect on environmental performance through capital markets. Blackman
et al. (2004)’s survey of managers of plants participating in PROPER generated
data suggesting that an important means by which the program spurs abatement
is improving managerial information. Garćıa et al. (2009) identify characteristics
of Indonesian plants that were more responsive to PROPER ratings and find that
foreign-owned plants, those in more densely populated areas, and those with low
initial ratings were more responsive, all other things equal.
The empirical literature on the workings of public disclosure initiatives other than
performance rating programs has focused mainly on capital markets. Although this
research clearly shows that public disclosure can affect stock prices (Dasgupta et al.,
2001, 2006; Laplante and Lanoie, 1994), it does not establish that the changes in
stock prices have, in turn, affected firms pollution control activities. However, Konar
and Cohen (1996) and Khanna et al. (1998) find evidence suggesting that this can
occur.
Beyond the studies cited thus far, empirical research on how public disclosure
per se has an impact is quite limited. However, the literatures on “voluntary reg-
ulation” and “informal regulation” are relevant. The literature on voluntary regu-
lation examines pressure to over-comply with mandatory regulations generated by
regulators, markets, and courts (see Lyon and Maxwell 2002 and Khanna 2001 for re-
views). For example, Segerson and Miceli (1998), Maxwell et al. (2000), and Glachant
(2007) present analytical models in which firms voluntarily over-comply to preempt
more stringent mandatory regulation; some empirical research supports this approach
(Videras and Alberini, 2000; Innes and Sam, 2008). Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995)
hypothesize that firms over-comply with environmental regulations to attract “green”
consumers. Some empirical evidence also supports this proposition. Finally, empir-
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ical research by Videras and Alberini (2000), Innes and Sam (2008), and Vidovic
and Khanna (2007) suggests that judicial pressure can also drive voluntary over-
compliance.
The literature on informal regulation focuses on pressures to abate generated by
private sector agents in developing countries where state regulation is weak or ef-
fectively nonexistent (see World Bank 1999 for a review). For example, Pargal and
Wheeler (1996) examine the environmental performance of plants in Indonesia at
a time when regulatory enforcement was negligible (and before the PROPER pro-
gram was initiated); they find that emissions were lower in communities with higher
per capita income and higher levels of education, implying that such communities
effectively pressure plants to abate (see also Blackman and Bannister 1998).
2.2.3 Conceptual framework
This section presents a heuristic graphical model of public disclosure to underpin
the econometric analysis (see Appendix for an analytical version of the model). It
draws upon the standard representation of a plants abatement decision in the envi-
ronmental economics literature (see, e.g., World Bank 1999). We assume marginal
abatement costs (MAC) are increasing in abatement while (private) marginal abate-
ment benefits (MAB) are decreasing in abatement (Figure 2-1). The plant chooses
the level of abatement, α∗, such that MAC equals MAB.
Drawing on the literature surveyed in Section 2, we define six channels through
which public disclosure might affect the firm’s abatement decision. The first five chan-
nels have to do with the costs that can be imposed on dirty firms by green consumers
(g), input (capital and labor) markets (k), courts (j), regulatory authorities (r), and
communities (c). The sixth channel is related to the costs of pollution abatement
arising from the plant’s need to acquire information about abatement technologies




Figure 1. Marginal abatement cost (MAC) and marginal abatement b nefit 
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Figure 2.1: Marginal abatement cost (MAC) and marginal abatement benefit (MAB)
schedules; optimal abatement level, α∗
nel might affect the firm’s abatement decision. First, public disclosure could either
reduce or enhance consumers’ demand for the firm’s output, depending on whether
the firm is relatively clean or dirty (g). Either effect, in turn, implies the marginal
benefit to the firm of cutting discharge will be greater regardless of the actual level
of abatement. For a clean firm, disclosure enhances its demand, but for a dirty firm,
disclosure decreases its demand. Graphically, in either case, the MAB curve shifts up
and in equilibrium the firm chooses a higher level of abatement. Similarly, depending
on whether the plant is dirty or clean, public disclosure could either raise or lower
costs imposed by regulators (r), input markets (k), communities (c), and courts (j).
Once again, regardless of whether the plant is clean or dirty, each of these effects
shifts the MAB curve up and results in a higher equilibrium level of abatement. Fi-
nally, public disclosure could reduce the cost to firms of acquiring information about
abatement (t), lowering the marginal cost of abatement at every level of abatement.




2.3.1 Green Rating Project
The Centre for Science and Environment (CSE), one of India’s best-known and
most influential environmental nongovernmental organizations, began work on the
GRP in 1997. According to CSE background materials, the program was urgently
needed to shore up India’s weak environmental regulatory institutions and was in-
spired by the Council on Economic Priorities, a now-defunct U.S. nongovernmental
organization that provided investors with annual ratings of the environmental perfor-
mance of U.S. companies.
To date, the GRP has rated the environmental performance of large plants in
four pollution-intensive industrial sectors: pulp and paper, chlor-alkali, cement, and
automobiles. Plants in the pulp and paper sector have been rated twice (once in 1999
and again in 2004); plants in the other three sectors have been rated just once. In each
rating, plants are assigned a numerical score from 0 to 100 and are awarded symbolic
leaves depending on their score: five leaves for scores of 75 and above, four for 50-74,
three for 35-49, two for 25-34, one for 15-24, and none for 14 and below. The GRP
scores are based on an evaluation of the plant’s life-cycle environmental impacts, from
the sourcing and processing of raw materials to the manufacture, use, and disposal
of products. The exceptionally detailed data needed to conduct this cradle-to-grave
analysis are collected from questionnaires administered to participating plants, along
with secondary data provided by local environmental regulatory institutions and other
sources. Both the questionnaires used to collect the data and the methodology used
to analyze them were designed by a panel of leading technical experts in each rated
sector. In addition, to ensure objectivity and transparency, the entire GRP program is
supervised by a panel comprising high-level representatives of industry, government,
the judiciary, academia, and nongovernmental organizations. Lastly, self-reported
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data from the firms are carefully checked by GRP inspectors and compared with the
secondary data.
In addition to informing the public about plants environmental performance, the
GRP also informs plants about their pollution and pollution abatement options. The
program uses the primary and secondary data it collects to construct a detailed envi-
ronmental profile of each plant and sends it to the facility for review before releasing
the ratings to the public. The program also publishes specific recommendations for
improving environmental performance in each sector. Finally, the ratings are released
at a high-profile public event by leading public figures. For example, some ratings
were released by the late Dr. K.R. Narayanan, India’s former president.
2.3.2 Pulp and Paper Sector
Pulp and paper is a notoriously dirty industry worldwide. The environmental per-
formance of mills in North America and Scandinavia, which tend to be much larger
and more modern than their developing-country counterparts, has improved consid-
erably over the past few decades. Indian mills lag behind, with per unit measures
of industrial pollution 5 to 10 times higher than those of Western plants (Centre for
Science and Environment, 2004).
Making paper involves four main steps, all of which generate water pollution:
raw material processing, pulping, bleaching, and papermaking.5 To reduce pollution
loadings, plants undertake both pollution control and prevention. All the plants rated
by the GRP have wastewater treatment plants. In addition, to prevent pollution,
mills have eliminated particularly dirty inputs, adopted good housekeeping measures,
improved chemical recovery systems, and modified the pulping process.
As previously mentioned, the pulp and paper sector is the only sector that has
been rated twice. As a result, survey data on environmental impact indicators and
5See Centre for Science and Environment (2004) or Schumacher and Sathaye (1999) for more
detail.
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other relevant variables are available for several years before and after the first rating.
This allows us to construct a counterfactual – that is, an estimate of what pollution
would have been absent the program – needed to identify the impact of the GRP.
Because the necessary data on environmental indicators and firm behavior are not
available after the second rating, we can analyze the effectiveness of only the first
rating.
The first rating included all 28 plants in the pulp and paper industry with a
production capacity exceeding 100 tons per day in fiscal year 19986 (India’s fiscal
year ends on March 31; all years referred to in this paper and accompanying figures
are fiscal years). Collectively, these plants were responsible for 59% of pulp and paper
production in India. They were contacted for the survey in January 1998, toward the
end of fiscal year 1998, and asked to provide data (that they normally track and
record anyway) for 1996 through 1998. The ratings for these plants were released by
Dr. Manmohan Singh, Indias current prime minister, on July 18, 1999. All major
Indian daily newspapers covered the event. Of these 28 plants, 22 were rated a second
time in 2004 and responded to questionnaires for 1999-2003.7 Again, the data were
reported retroactively. For the remainder of the paper we will refer to years 1996 to
1998 as pre-disclosure and 1999 to 2003 as post-disclosure.
2.3.3 Trends in pollution indicators
Average annual discharge data for 1996 to 2003, as shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.3,
suggest that the environmental performance of particularly dirty plants – those that
received one leaf in the 1999 rating – did in fact improve significantly during 1999,
the year of the first GRP rating. Figure 2.2 shows trends in chemical oxygen demand
(COD), and Figure 2.3 shows trends in total suspended solids (TSS) – two common
6By way of comparison, the average plant in the United States has a capacity of nearly 600
tons/day (CSE 2004). GRP’s size criteria excluded more than 500 smaller plants.
7Of the six plants that were rated in the first period but not the second, five were permanently
closed and one was temporarily closed after the first rating.
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Figure 2. Annual unweighted average discharges of chemical oxygen demand (COD) 
from 22 pulp and paper plants participating in India’s Green Ratings Project, 

































Figure 3. Annual unweighted average discharges of total suspended solids (TSS) from 22 
pulp and paper plants participating in India’s Green Rating Project,  




























Figure 2.2: Annual unweighted average discharges of chemical oxygen demand (COD)
from 22 pulp and paper plants p rticipating in India’s Green Rating
Project, by performance rating
measures of water pollution.8 Both pollutants declined dramatically after 1998 for
plants that received a one-leaf rating, but not for plants with higher ratings.
The fact that the most dramatic reductions in discharges took place in 1999, the
year that the ratings were released, suggests that the rating prompted improvements
in the environmental performance of poorly performing plants. These reductions,
however, could have been caused by contemporaneous changes in technological, mar-
ket, and regulatory conditions that influence the plants pollution loadings. For exam-
ple, they could have been caused by reductions in the relative price of cleaner inputs
that happened to coincide with the release of the GRP ratings. To identify the impact
of the GRP, we develop an econometric model that can control for such confounding
factors.
8COD is a measure of the amount of oxygen needed to fully oxidize the organic compounds in
water to carbon dioxide; it is a linear function of the chemical composition of the organic pollutants
in a sample of water. TSS is even more straightforward: it is the dry weight of particles suspended
in a sample of water and, like COD, is typically expressed in mg/L. To properly scale for water use,
we convert both measures and express them as kg/bdmt of product. This is done by multiplying
first by a constant, then by the amount of water used to produce a bone dry metric ton of product.
14
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Figure 2. Annual unweighted average discharges of chemical oxygen demand (COD) 
from 22 pulp and paper plants participating in India’s Green Ratings Project, 

































Figure 3. Annual unweighted average discharges of total suspended solids (TSS) from 22 
pulp and paper plants participating in India’s Green Rating Project,  




























Figure 2.3: Annual unweighted average discharges of total suspended solids (TSS)
from 22 pulp and paper plants participating in India’s Green Rating
Project, by performance rating
2.4 Empirical framework
The first goal of our empirical analysis is to determine whether the drops in COD
and TSS levels depicted in Figures 2 and 3 were caused by the GRP and not by
confounding factors. In addition, if we find that the GRP was, in fact, responsible,
we seek to identify the channels through which it had this effect.
2.4.1 Econometric model
2.4.1.1 GRPs impact
To isolate the impact of the GRP, we run separate fixed-effects ordinary least
squares (OLS) panel-data models for COD and TSS of the form
yit = αi + β1TREND + β2POSTGRPt + β3TREND ∗ONELEAFi+
β4POSTGRPt ∗ONELEAFi + β5Xit + uit
(2.1)
where ai is the plant fixed effect, TREND is a linear time trend, POSTGRPt is a
dummy variable that takes the value one for the post-disclosure period (1999-2003)
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and zero otherwise, ONELEAFi is a dummy variable for plants that received a one-
leaf rating, and Xit is a vector of confounding factors including plant characteristics,
input prices, and measures of regulatory pressure (Table 1).9 TREND allows us to
control for exogenous improvements in technology that could affect pollution levels
prior to and after the information disclosure.10 TREND ∗ ONELEAF allows ex-
ogenous improvements in technology (both before and after the disclosure) to differ
between dirtier plants and relatively clean plants. POSTGRPt is included to cap-
ture the impact of the ratings on firm behavior. Finally, POSTGRPt ∗ONELEAF
allows the effect of POSTGRPt to differ between dirty and clean plants.
11 To allow
for heteroskedasticity across plants and arbitrary serial correlation within each plant,
we report standard errors that are clustered by plant (Wooldridge, 2002).12
9Although we expect the error terms in the COD and TSS regressions to be correlated, we do not
use a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) approach because there is no reason, a priori, to omit
any explanatory variables from either of the two regressions. When the same explanatory variables
appear in both regressions, SUR is equivalent to OLS (Greene, 2002) and yields no efficiency gain.
The only advantage of SOLS in this case is that it allows for joint hypothesis testing across the two
regressions. The disadvantage is that SOLS routines in standard statistical packages do not allow
for clustered standard errors. SOLS results (available from the authors upon request) comport with
the OLS results presented in Tables 2 and 3: although the individual coefficients of interest are not
always significant, they have the same sign, and testing the joint significance of these coefficients in
both equations rejects the null hypothesis that they are jointly zero.
10The choice of a linear trend term, as opposed to other functional forms, is based on preliminary
regressions using pre-disclosure data. In these regressions, available from the authors upon request,
the addition of a quadratic term adds little explanatory power.
11We also experimented with the possibility that the disclosure program induced a persistent
increase in the rate of environmental progress (which would be consistent with a change in the slope
of the trend term) rather than in a one-time shift of the equilibrium path (consistent with a one-time
decrease in the intercept term). The most obvious way to identify such an effect would be to include
an additional trend term that takes only positive values after disclosure. However, given the sample
size and a high degree of multi-collinearity between the post-disclosure trend term and the original
trend term, this renders identification difficult. Furthermore, regression results (available from the
authors upon request) suggest that the one-time drop is more consistent with the data than is a
change in the trend. Accordingly, we proceed without the post-disclosure trend variable.
12Although the inclusion of fixed plant effects allows for heterogeneity in the form of a mean
plant-specific unobservable component, we still need to allow the variance to differ across plants.
Also, although it is reasonable to assume independence of the error terms across plants, we cannot,
a priori, rule out persistence in the error term within a plant.
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Table 2.1: Variables in econometric analysis and descriptive statistics
Variable Description Mean S.D. Min. Max.
COD Natural log of chemical oxygen demand (kg/bdmt) 3.37 0.9 0.04 5.43
TSS Natural log of total suspended solids (kg/bdmt) 2.1 1.07 -2.74 4.08
POSTGRP 1999 or later (0/1) 0.72 0.45 0 1
ONELEAF Received one leaf in 1999 grp rating (0/1) 0.31 0.47 0 1
TREND Linear time trend term (1996 = 1, 1997 = 2, 2003 = 8) 4.74 2.23 0 8
SCALE Natural log of output (kg/bdmt) 11.19 0.55 9.84 12.21
FINALGOOD Percentage of output that is final (vs. intermediate) product 0.62 0.35 0 1
PCTBAMBOO Percentage of fiber inputs from bamboo 0.29 0.34 0 1
PCTGRASSES Percentage of fiber inputs from grasses 0.02 0.08 0 0.56
PCTRECY CL Percentage of fiber inputs from recycled materials 0.12 0.22 0 1
PCTPULP Percentage of fiber inputs from market pulp 0.1 0.22 0 1
FORSHARE Percentage of sales derived from exports 0.05 0.05 0 0.2
PRICE WAGES Inflation-adjusted national avg. daily
wages for nonagricultural unskilled workers 0.35 0.02 0.32 0.39
PRICE CL Inflation-adjusted national avg. price of chlorine 1.01 0.12 0.83 1.25
PRICE NAOH Inflation-adjusted national avg. price of sodium hydroxide 0.83 0.13 0.68 1.08
PRICE WOOD Inflation-adjusted national avg. price of wood 1.17 0.15 0.96 1.41
PERMIT Water effluent permit (0/1) 0.87 0.34 0 1
EFFRIV ER Percentage effluents discharged into a river (vs. land, etc.) 0.68 0.42 0 1
WEALTH Percentage households in subdistrict that own moped 0.41 0.2 0.12 0.79
SINGLE Stand alone plant (0/1) 0.45 0.51 0 1
2.4.1.2 GRP channels
To analyze the channels through which the GRP potentially affects firm behavior,
we run separate models for COD and TSS of the form
yit = αi + β1TREND + β2POSTGRPt + β3TREND ∗ONELEAFi+
β4POSTGRPt ∗ONELEAFi + β5Xit + β6TREND ∗ Zi+
β7POSTGRPt ∗ Zi + uit
(2.2)
where Zi is a vector of time-invariant plant and community variables, such as whether
the plant is part of a conglomerate and the level of community wealth. This specifica-
tion allows us to determine whether plants with certain characteristics and in certain
communities responded differently to the program. This in turn sheds light on the
channels through which GRP has an effect. Note that because these community
and plant variables are time-invariant, we cannot identify their effect on pollution
intensity independent of the plant fixed effect. This does not pose a major problem,
however, since unlike Pargal and Wheeler (1996), we are not interested in the coef-
ficients on these variables per se. Rather, we are interested in determining whether
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these characteristics have any additional effect once the disclosure program changes
the institutional landscape.
2.4.2 Data
As discussed above, most of our data come from GRP surveys. In addition,
we used data from the 2001 Indian census to construct proxies for several commu-
nity characteristics; data from Prowess, an on-line business database, to construct
company-level (as opposed to plant-level) variables and a regional energy price index;
and finally, data from Indiastat, an on-line database of Indian economic statistics,
to construct price indices for a number of inputs.13 The independent and depen-
dent variables used in the regressions are described below. See Table 1 for summary
statistics.
2.4.2.1 Environmental performance
Because all 22 plants in the sample have effluent treatment plants, COD and TSS
measurements reflect posttreatment or end-of-pipe quantities. In India, as in most
countries, regulatory standards for these pollutants are specified in milligrams per
liter of effluent. In India, however, where water is inexpensive, the use of this metric
creates an incentive for plants to dilute their liquid discharges. To control for this
effect, we measure COD and TSS in kilograms (kg) per bone-dry metric ton (bdmt)
of pulp and paper product. Our resulting measure, kg/bdmt, gives water pollution
per unit of product produced. Finally, because we are interested in the responses of
both clean and dirty plants, we use logged values of both dependent variables so that
our coefficient estimates measure the relative change in the dependent variable for a
given absolute change in the values of the respective explanatory variables.
13For information on Prowess, see http://www.cmie.com/database/?service=database-
products.htm, and for information on Indiastat, see http://www.indiastat.com.
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2.4.2.2 Confounding factors
We use a broad set of regressors to control for factors other than public disclosure
that affect pollution loadings, including variables related to plant characteristics, in-
put prices, and interactions with regulators. Unless otherwise indicated, these data
were derived from GRP survey data. Among the plant characteristics, SCALE is
the log of the amount of final product produced by a given plant in a given year
(measured in bone dry metric tons because moisture content can vary between dif-
ferent classes of products). FINALGOOD is the proportion of a plants output that
represents final products (such as writing and tissue paper) used directly by con-
sumers. This variable is meant to proxy for consumer pressure for environmental
quality. PCTBAMBOO, PCTGRASSES, PCTRECY CL, and PCTPULP mea-
sure the proportion of fiber inputs derived from bamboo, grasses, recyclables, and
market pulp, respectively (wood is the omitted category, and agroresidues are also
dropped, because these are collinear with plant fixed effects). FORSHARE is the
share of sales derived from exports, a firm-level variable derived from the Prowess
database. This variable is meant to capture pressure for improved environmental
performance generated by foreign investors and consumers.
Among the input price variables, PRICE NAOH and PRICE CL are inflation-
adjusted country-wide price indices for sodium hydroxide and chlorine, the major
chemicals used in the pulping and bleaching processes. PRICE WOOD is an inflation-
adjusted national price index for wood. This serves as a proxy for fiber input prices.14
Finally, PRICE WAGES is an inflation-adjusted national price index for average
daily wage rates for nonagricultural, unskilled workers.
14We were unable to find sufficient data to construct similar indices for any of the other fiber
inputsbamboo, grasses, agro-residues, recycled paper, and market pulp. However, these prices will
generally be related to wood prices in India where the fiber inputs are substitutable Centre for
Science and Environment (2004). Also we do not include a variable measuring water costs because
the price industrial users pay for water is minute and there was no variation over time in the water
prices for period in question.
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Two variables are used to proxy for changes in regulatory pressure. PERMIT
is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the plant has been granted a water
effluent permit by its state pollution control board and zero otherwise. EFFRIV ER
is the percentage of the plant’s effluent discharged into a river (versus on land or in
the sea) in a given year. Effluent discharged into a river must, by law, be cleaner, so
it is important to control for shifts in the discharge destinations of effluents.
2.4.2.3 Channels
We use two variables to establish possible channels of influence, WEALTH and
SINGLE. We experimented with several other variables that could conceivably be
related to the level of plant response.15 However, to keep the exposition manageable,
we present (in Section 5.2) only those models in which interaction terms are signifi-
cant. WEALTH is the percentage of households in the plants subdistrict (similar to a
U.S. county) that own mopeds.16 SINGLE is a dummy variable that takes the value
one if the plant is the unique establishment owned by the company, and zero other-
wise. This variable serves as a proxy for organizational differences that could affect
the way different plants respond to the GRP ratings. Any plant for which SINGLE
equals zero is either part of a larger pulp and paper company or part of a diversified
conglomerate.
15These include LITERACY , the percentage of the population that is literate in the municipality
where the plant is located; CASTE, the percentage of the municipal population that belongs to a
scheduled caste or scheduled tribe; AGLABOR, the proportion of the workers in the municipality
who are either cultivators or agricultural laborers; URBANPCT , the proportion of the population
in the subdistrict who live in municipalities that are classified as urban; and COMPTOWN , the
percentage of nonagricultural laborers in a subdistrict who work for the plant. We also investigated
whether interaction terms involving variables that proxy for other channels were significant. These
include ENFWATER, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the plant had been fined or faced some
other enforcement action from the regional pollution control board for water pollution prior to
disclosure; COMWATER, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the plant had been the subject of
registered complaints about water pollution prior to disclosure; and GOV , a dummy variable that
equals 1 for government-owned plants.
16The census data provide alternative measures of wealth, all involving the percentage of house-
holds owning a particular asset (or employing banking services). These measures are all highly




As previously noted, Figures 2.2 and 2.3 suggest not only that COD and TSS
levels are lower after disclosure but also that reductions were greatest among the
worst-performing plants. The first objective of our empirical analysis is simply to test
whether these results are statistically significant. Two specifications for each depen-
dent variable are presented in Table 2.2; Model 1 (for COD) and Model 2 (for TSS)
include only regressors related to the disclosure program: TREND, POSTGRP , and
ONELEAF , along with interaction terms for ONELEAF . Models 3 and 4 include
all time-varying covariates as well.
In Models 2, 3, and 4, the POSTGRP dummy is not significant. In Model 1 it
is positive and significant, although this significance disappears when all covariates
are included in Model 3. We conclude that the 1999 GRP rating did not have a
significant pollution-reducing impact on the average plant, including both good and
poor environmental performers.
The interaction terms in Table 2.2 – ONELEAF ∗ TREND and ONELEAF ∗
POSTGRP – allow us to test a second hypothesis suggested by Figures 2.2 and 2.3:
following the first rating, one-leaf plants improved their environmental performance
more than two- and three-leaf plants. The negative and statistically significant co-
efficients on ONELEAF ∗ POSTGRP in all four models in Table 2.2 suggest that
this hypothesis is correct.
The important question that follows from this pair of findings is whether the net
effect of GRP on one-leaf plants was significant. A simple Wald test of the sum of
the coefficients on POSTGRP and ONELEAF ∗ POSTGRP allows us to test this
hypothesis. The results, reported in the bottom row of Table 2.2, suggest that GRP
did drive reductions in TSS by one-leaf plants. The net effect for COD was not
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Table 2.2: OLS regression results: Green Ratings Project impact
Model number 1 2 3 4
Dependent variable COD TSS COD TSS
TREND -0.136** -0.12** -0.124** -0.154**
[0.025] [0.026] [0.039] [0.032]
POSTGRP 0.308** 0.021 0.201 0.087
[0.107] [0.109] [0.129] [0.111]
ONELEAF ∗ TREND 0.043 0.064 0.014 0.066
[0.038] [0.043] [0.033] [0.046]
ONELEAF ∗ POSTGRP -0.446** -0.445** -0.411* -0.527*

















PRICE NAOH 0.028 -0.874*
[0.527] [0.361]




EFFRIV ER -4.399** -4.551**
[1.444] [0.790]
PRICE WOOD -0.186 -1.093**
[0.503] [0.363]
Constant 3.85** 2.695** 6.89+ 10.577**
[0.066] [0.080] [3.321] [1.981]
Observations 155 153 154 152
R-squared 0.49 0.58 0.56 0.64
Wald statistic -1.46 -3.9 -1.1 -2.09
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Clustered standard errors in brackets; all regressions include plant fixed effects
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significant, however.
In all regressions TREND is negative and significant, suggesting that exoge-
nous technological improvements in the pulp and paper industry, independent of the
GRP, are also responsible for declines in pollution loads. The results for the other
covariates unrelated to the GRP rating shown in columns 3 and 4 are largely con-
sistent with stylized facts about the determinants of water pollution in the pulp and
paper industry. In Model 4 (for TSS), SCALE, PCTRECY CL, FORSHARE,
PRICE NAOH, PRICE CL, PERMIT , EFFRIV ER, and PRICE WOOD are
negative and significant, and PRICE WAGES is positive and significant. In Model 3
(for COD), EFFRIV ER is negative and significant. These results comport with the
conventional wisdom that pollution abatement entails economies of scale (SCALE);
pollution loadings are decreasing in the share of non-wood inputs (PCTRECY CL);
plants that export are subject to more pressure to improve their environmental per-
formance (FORSHARE); pollution loadings are decreasing in the price of polluting
inputs (PRICE NAOH, PRICE CL, and PRICE WOOD); regulatory pressure
spurs abatement (EFFRIV ER and PERMIT ); and labor and pollution abatement
are substitutes in production (PRICE WAGES). It is encouraging that coefficients
on these regressors have the same sign, if not significance, in Models 3 and 4.
To assess the economic significance of the estimates, we analyze the effect of
disclosure on a hypothetical plant that received one leaf in the first rating and had
mean values for all other covariates, using the estimation results from Models 3 and 4.
With GRP disclosure, such a plant’s COD discharges would decrease by 63% between
1996 and 2003. However, absent disclosure, the plant’s COD discharges would have
decreased by only 54%. The effect of the disclosure program is stronger when we focus
on TSS. The plant’s emissions would decrease 65% with the disclosure program but
only 46% without it.
Finally, it is important to note that of the six pulp and paper plants that partici-
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pated only in the first round of the GRP, five – those ranked 5th, 17th, and 24th-26th
of the 28 plants evaluated in the first roundwent out of business before the second
round was initiated. In at least two cases, environmental protests were an impor-
tant reason.17 Although we do not have enough observations to formally model these
closures (using a Heckman selection approach), they suggest that, if anything, our
econometric results probably understate the impact of the 1999 ratings.
2.5.2 GRP channels
The regressions presented in Table 2.3 explore whether certain types of plants
were more responsive to GRP disclosure. We use an identification strategy similar
to that employed to test whether one-leaf plants were more responsive: we create
variables that interact various time-invariant plant or community characteristics with
POSTGRP .18 In addition, we control for the possibility that these characteris-
tics affect the slope of the trend term using a second set of variables that inter-
act the time-invariant plant or community characteristics with TREND. Instead
of including all interaction terms in a single model, we include pairs of interac-
tion terms corresponding to a single characteristic (e.g., TREND ∗WEALTH and
POSTGRP ∗WEALTH) in separate models.
There are three reasons: several of the interaction variables formed are highly
collinear (in part because all take a value of zero for the three pre-disclosure years);
including several sets of these interaction variables simultaneously poses a degrees-
of-freedom problem; and we are more interested in identifying channels by which
disclosure has an effect than in identifying the strongest among several closely related
channels. To make the exposition manageable, we present only those models in which
17Personal communication, Monali Zeya Hazra, Center for Science and the Environment, March
13, 2007.
18Some of the characteristics we use to construct these interaction terms, such as EFFRIV ER,
display some minor variation over time. For these, we calculate the pre-disclosure average and



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































interaction terms are significant.
Table 2.3 presents results from 10 models intended to identify channels through
which GRP operates. Model 5 (for COD) and Model 6 (for TSS) include WEALTH
interaction terms, and Model 7 (for COD) and Model 8 (for TSS) include SINGLE
interaction terms. As discussed below, we include additional models withONELEAF
interaction terms to disentangle the effects of baseline environmental performance
from other plant and community characteristics: Model 9 (for COD) and Model 10
(for TSS) include WEALTH interaction terms along with ONELEAF interaction
terms and Model 11 (for COD) and Model 12 (for TSS) include SINGLE interac-
tion terms along with ONELEAF interaction terms.
Turning to the results, first note that even with the inclusion of these additional
interaction terms, there is virtually no change in the qualitative results on the controls
discussed in the previous section.
In both Models 5 and 6, WEALTH ∗POSTGRP is negative, and it is significant
in the TSS model. This result suggests that plants in wealthier communities were
more responsive to disclosure than those in poorer communities. Several explanations
are possible. Residents of relatively wealthy communities may have been more likely
to pressure plants to improve their performance following a GRP rating. Alterna-
tively, or perhaps as a result, regulators in such communities may have been more
ready to crack down on poorly performing plants following disclosure.
Turning to Models 7 and 8, the interaction term SINGLE ∗POSTGRP is nega-
tive and significant in the TSS model, implying that plants that are part of a conglom-
erate or multi-plant firm were less responsive to GRP ratings than stand-alone plants.
Again, several explanations are possible. Plants that are part of a conglomerate may
have better access to the human capital needed for environmental management, be
better informed because they share best practices with other plants in the same firm,
and/or have better access to the financial capital needed for pollution control.
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Though those explanations appear plausible, it is also possible that plants in
wealthier communities and plants that are not part of a conglomerate were more
responsive to disclosure because they were dirtier to begin with. Simple correlation
coefficients suggest that this may be true in the case of stand-alone plants; the evi-
dence is less clear that dirty plants were located in wealthier communities. In Models
9 through 12, we add the ONELEAF interaction terms (ONELEAF ∗ TREND
and ONELEAF ∗ POSTGRP ) to disentangle the effects of baseline environmental
performance from other plant and community characteristics. In these regressions
the WEALTH and SINGLE interaction terms remain significant, although levels
of significance are attenuated. These results suggest that the channels proxied for by
WEALTH and SINGLE interaction terms facilitate environmental improvement
above and beyond that driven by the simple fact that plants in wealthy communities
and those that are not part of conglomerates tend to be dirtier.
2.5.3 Robustness checks
In this subsection we address some possible robustness issues.19 First, with an un-
balanced panel covering at most 22 plants over eight years, we have a limited number
of observations. Therefore, we need to make sure that our regression results are not
being driven by outliers. To that end we performed an outlier check. We repeated
each regression in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 22 times, omitting one plant in each regres-
sion. The ONELEAF , WEALTH, and SINGLE interaction terms are significant
in each regression. A second concern is that several of our regressors, including the
composition of fiber inputs, as well as SCALE and FINALGOOD, could be en-
dogenous if abatement decisions and production decisions are made simultaneously.
However, these variables display only minor temporal variation, so any endogeneity
should be minimal. As a robustness check, we re-estimated all regressions presented in
19The results discussed in this section are available from the authors upon request.
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Tables 2.2 and 2.3, omitting the potentially endogenous regressors PCTBAMBOO,
PCTGRASSES, PCTRECY CL, PCTPULP , SCALE, and FINALGOOD. In
all cases, our results are qualitatively unchanged. We conclude that endogeneity is
not an important practical concern in this context.
Finally, note that in the interest of preserving degrees of freedom and concise
exposition, we have omitted regressors whose inclusion had no effect: real price of
coal, vintage of the plant, other types of regulatory permits, share of sales spent on
R&D, and diversity of the product mix produced by each plant.
2.6 Conclusion
We have used eight years of exceptionally detailed survey data on 22 of Indias
largest pulp and paper plants to evaluate the Green Rating Program, an Indian envi-
ronmental performance public disclosure program. We sought to determine whether
a 1999 GRP rating caused plants to reduce their water pollution loadings. We have
also attempted to shed light on the mechanism by which the rating may have done
this. We found that the GRP drove significant reductions in pollution loadings among
dirty plants but not among cleaner ones. This result comports with the finding by
Dasgupta et al. (2007) that performance ratings programs in Indonesia, Philippines,
China, and Vietnam all led to improvements among plants with moderately poor
performance records, but not among those with either very bad or good records.
We also found that pulp and paper plants located in wealthier communities were
more responsive to GRP ratings, as were stand-alone plants. We hypothesized that
the former result suggests that environmental performance ratings programs may
have an effect by mobilizing local communities and/or regulators to exert pressure
for reductions in discharges. We hypothesized that the latter result implies that
performance rating programs are more effective when targeted at plants with better
access to human and financial capital for pollution abatement.
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This study adds to a thin but fast-growing body of evidence that public disclosure
programs can be an effective environmental management tool, even in developing
countries where weak regulatory institutions, limited political will, and other problems
hamstring conventional pollution control policies. Although an analysis of the costs
of administering the GRP is beyond the scope of our study, we suspect it has been less
expensive than conventional policies that involve standard setting and enforcement.
If that is indeed the case, then our findings indicate that public disclosure programs
may be an efficient as well as effective environmental management strategy.
Finally, we note that whereas virtually all national-level performance ratings pro-
grams in developing countries are administered by state environmental regulatory
agencies, the GRP is run by a nongovernmental organization. To the extent the GRP
is replicable, it suggests that even in countries where institutional and political con-




This appendix presents a simple analytical version of the graphical model of public
disclosure in Section 3. To keep the model as simple as possible and focus attention
on pollution abatement, we assume that the firm makes production and abatement
decisions sequentially. First it chooses a level of output, q, and a vector of levels
of financial and human capital, k. Subsequently, it chooses a level of abatement, α,
treating both q and k as fixed. We model the firms second-stage abatement decision
only. Note that abatement here may also include pollution prevention. The firm
chooses α to maximize profit, Π, given by
Π = P [g(α, d)]q − C[α, t(d)]−W (α, d)k −H(α, d) (2.3)
where
H(α, d) = r(α, d) + c(α, d) + j(α, d) (2.4)
and
• P (·) is the equilibrium price of output;
• g is an index of green consumerism – the sensitivity of P to the plants discharges;
• d is a measure of the public disclosure of information about the plants discharges;
• q is the quantity of output;
• C(·) is the cost of abatement;
• t(·) is the plants information about abatement technologies and its own dis-
charges;
• W (·) is a vector of the costs of two types of capital, financial and human;
• k is a vector of two types of capital, financial and human;
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• H(·) is the total cost of the plants discharges generated by external agents;
• r(·) is costs generated by formal regulatory authorities;
• c(·) is costs generated by communities; and
• j(·) is costs generated by courts.
Following the literature discussed in Section 2, we make the following assumptions
about the price and cost functions:
• the stronger is green consumerism, the lower is the equilibrium price the plant
receives for its output (P is decreasing in g);20
• the less the plant abates and the more the public knows about its discharges,
the stronger is green consumerism (g is decreasing in α and increasing in d),
the higher are the costs of financial and human capital (W is decreasing in α
and is increasing in d), and the greater are the costs imposed on the plant by
external agents (r, c, and j are all decreasing in α and increasing in d); and
• the less the plant abates and the more information it has about its discharges
and abatement technologies, the lower is the marginal cost of abatement (C is
increasing in α and decreasing in t).
Finally, we make the reasonable assumptions that
• abatement has a diminishing marginal impact on green consumerism, capital
costs, and costs imposed by external agents; and an increasing marginal impact
on abatement costs (g, W , H, and C are all convex in abatement).
20To keep the exposition simple, we implicitly assume that the plant is an inherently dirty one –
for example, an aged coal-fired power plant – so that regardless of its choice of α, green consumerism
always reduces equilibrium price. We could just as easily assume that the plant is an inherently
clean one whose equilibrium price is always increased by green consumerism. Allowing green con-
sumerism to increase or decrease equilibrium price depending on the plant’s choice of α makes the
model needlessly complex given our limited goal of illustrating how various channels discussed in
the literature operate.
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The term in parenthesis represents the marginal benefit of abatement due to an
increase in the equilibrium price of output (the first term in braces); a reduction in
the costs of labor and capital (the second term); and a reduction in costs imposed by
formal regulatory authorities, communities, and the courts (the third term). We will
refer to the sum of these three terms as the marginal abatement benefit (MAB). The
last term in (2.5) is the marginal abatement cost (MAC). The plant chooses α∗ such
that MAB is equal to MAC.
Using (2.5), it is straightforward to show that the total derivative of α∗ with
respect to d is unambiguously negative. Therefore, public disclosure will increase
abatement. Figure 1 makes this point graphically. Given our assumptions on P (·),
C(·), W (·), and H(·), the MAC schedule is increasing in α and the MAB schedule
is decreasing in α. The plant chooses the level of discharges where these schedules
intersect. An increase in d will cause t(·) to increase and the MAC schedule to shift
down. It will also cause g(·), W (·), and H(·) to increase and the MAB schedule to
shift up. Each of these shifts will cause α∗ to increase.
21The convexity of g(·), C(·), W (·), and H(·) guarantee that the second-order condition is met.
32
CHAPTER III
Do State Renewable Portfolio Standards Promote
In-State Investment in Renewable Capacity?1
3.1 Introduction
In the United States, power plants are responsible for approximately 40 percent
of the nation’s carbon dioxide emissions, leading environmental and other interest
groups to target this sector as they seek to reduce emissions in response to concerns
of global climate change. The lack of action by the federal government has led some
state and local governments to fill this void with a variety of policy approaches (Engel
and Orbach, 2008). One of the most common state-level policy instruments, and the
object of significant attention, is known as a renewable portfolio standard (hereafter,
RPS). An RPS is a policy that ensures that a minimum amount of renewable energy
(such as wind, solar, biomass, or geothermal energy) is included in the portfolio
of electric generating resources serving a state. RPS regulations generally impose
obligations that increase over time. The stated intent of these policy measures is
usually some combination of increasing the diversity, reliability, public health and
1The material in this chapter represents joint work with Haitao Yin
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environmental benefits of the energy mix.2 As of April 2009, 30 states3 and the
District of Columbia have passed renewable portfolio standards.
While RPS policies all share several key features, they vary dramatically in design
across states. These design differences have been carefully detailed by Berry and
Jaccard (2001); Wiser et al. (2005); Wiser et al. (2007); and Wiser and Barbose
(2008). However, econometric analyses of the effectiveness of RPS policies have largely
ignored this heterogeneity in RPS design. For methodological convenience, previous
empirical analyses have treated RPS policies as identical or have characterized the
differences among them in an overly simplistic manner. A primary argument in the
present study is that without properly accounting for the wide heterogeneity we see
in RPS policies, empirical studies of their effectiveness may result in very misleading
conclusions. Moreover, careful analysis of these differences and their influence on RPS
effectiveness can afford policymakers an opportunity to improve the effectiveness of
RPS policies through their redesign.
In this paper, we develop a measure for the strength of an RPS. This measure
explicitly considers some key design features that could potentially affect the mag-
nitude of the incentives for developing new renewable capacity. This new measure
suggests that some seemingly aggressive RPS policies in fact provide only weak incen-
tives, while some seemingly moderate RPS policies are in fact relatively ambitious.
It follows that in any analysis addressing the question of whether RPS policies are
effective drivers of investment in renewable electricity capacity, imposing uniformity
2Some proponents of RPS policies have also claimed that they can provide employment benefits
(the often-discussed “green jobs”), or generate learning economies important for the development of
renewable technologies, though these questions are not examined in the present paper.
3The 30 states are AZ, CA, CO, CT, DE, HI, IA, IL, MA, MD, ME, MI, MN, MO, MT, NC,
NH, NJ, NM, NV, NY, OH, OR, PA, RI, TX, VA, VT, WA, and WI. Virginia and Vermont have
passed unconventional policies that have been deemed by some to be “optional”. However, unlike
the voluntary policy, of say, North Dakota, the policies in both Virginia and Vermont contain
credible commitments that provide real incentives for renewable development. Nonetheless, we have
also performed the empirical analysis presented in this paper with alternative classifications of the
Virginia and Vermont policies, and the results are qualitatively identical. These results are available
upon request.
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on the policy is inappropriate.
Based on the new measure, we present the most rigorous statistical analysis of RPS
policies to date. For the purposes of this paper, we define effectiveness of an RPS
policy as the extent to which it increases investment in in-state renewable electricity
capacity. We find that RPS policies do in fact lead to a statistically significant increase
in in-state renewable electricity development. This result stands in sharp contrast to
those when the differences in RPS stringency are ignored or measured in an overly
simplistic manner, as has been done in previous studies.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide
a brief overview of the research done on RPS policies to date. In section 3, we present
some background on RPS policies, key dimensions of heterogeneity in these policies,
and propose a new measure for the stringency of such policies. In section 4, we present
an empirical framework for estimation of the effectiveness of an RPS in promoting
renewable energy development. Section 5 describes the data and compares different
measures for RPS stringency. In section 6, we present the results of our estimations.
Finally, in section 7, we conclude.
3.2 Literature Review
Rigorous study of renewable portfolio standards has been rare. In this section,
we outline the existing literature on these relatively new policies. In this paper, our
primary concern is not the efficiency of RPS policies, but rather their effectiveness
– which is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for efficiency. Furthermore,
while first-best efficiency is obviously ideal, the effectiveness criterion may ultimately
be more useful when other more efficient policies being considered (usually cap-and-
trade or a carbon tax) are politically infeasible. Nonetheless, we review the literature
on both questions in this section.
State-level RPS policies are often seen by economists as a suboptimal policy for
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two key reasons. First, since the most significant environmental benefits from RPS
legislation come from the internalization of global externalities, a regional approach
runs the risk of inducing welfare losses in the regulated region without incurring
environmental benefits, as the damaging pollutants can continue to be produced else-
where. For example, Bushnell et al. (2008) argued that the effectiveness of such local
initiatives is limited due to a leakage or reshuffling problem and claimed that RPS
policies are “largely symbolic unless they facilitate change beyond their local regions”.
Second, since many states require that the renewable electricity be generated in-state,
the principle of allowing the cost of pollutant reduction to be minimized by allowing
these reductions to occur where they are least costly is violated.
Two recent papers have developed theoretical models to examine the cost-effectiveness
of RPS policies. Palmer and Burtraw (2005) perform numerical simulations to pre-
dict the impacts of a national RPS, and find that it raises electricity prices, but that
it is not as cost-effective as a cap-and-trade policy for reducing carbon emissions.
Fischer and Newell (2008) develop and calibrate a model that predicts that an RPS-
like policy is a sub-optimal policy whether the goal is reducing carbon emissions or
promoting technological progress. A third paper, (Michaels, 2007), though lacking a
formal model, is also extremely critical of the oft-proposed federal RPS, arguing that
it is an inefficient way to achieve any of the policy objectives often attributed to an
RPS. Further, the article’s author argues that the record of state implementation of
RPS policies has, thus far, been largely symbolic.
Nonetheless, and perhaps in part because they are perceived to address several
political goals at once, state-level RPS policies have proliferated. Lyon and Yin (2009)
examine the political economy behind these policies, and find that renewable energy
potentials (measures of the strength of the wind and solar resources in a state),
Democratic majorities in the state legislature, and organization of the renewable
industry are all significant antecedents of a state-level RPS. Interestingly, they do not
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find that high levels of existing renewable development make a state more likely to
adopt an RPS.
Distinct from, though not orthogonal to, the question of efficiency is the question of
effectiveness. Namely, do RPS policies achieve their primary stated goal of increasing
renewable capacity and generation in the states in which they are passed? The most
prominent studies have not included complete statistical analyses and have concluded
that the policies are either ineffective (Bushnell et al., 2008) or “largely symbolic”
(Michaels, 2007).
As far as we know, only three (Menz and Vachon, 2006; Adelaja and Hailu, 2008;
Kneifel, 2008) studies have employed econometric analysis to empirically identify the
impacts of RPS on renewable energy development. These studies, however, have
taken a rather blunt approach. Using cross-sectional data, Menz and Vachon (2006)
and Adelaja and Hailu (2008) both establish a positive correlation between existence
of an RPS and renewable development, but the use of cross-sectional data precludes
any conclusions regarding causality. Furthermore, these studies treat RPS’s as being
uniform across states. Menz and Vachon (2006) and Adelaja and Hailu (2008) both
use a binary RPS variable, which abstracts away from the very real heterogeneity
across RPS’s.
Kneifel (2008), on the other hand, uses a panel data approach and finds that RPS
policies do not lead to an increase in renewable capacity in a state if the requirement is
based on generation, as is common in most states4. His study does in fact differentiate
among RPSs by using their nominal requirements, which are the RPS goals that are
written into the laws, as his measure of the strength of the policies. However, as
evidenced in this paper, using nominal requirement as the measure of an RPS fails to
capture some important design features that are decisive for RPS effectiveness and
4Given that most of the relatively few capacity-based policies are enforced on the basis of gen-
eration, using capacity conversion factors that are usually publicly-known, we argue that Kniefel.s
differentiation between capacity- and generation-based policies is a false dichotomy.
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therefore may also lead to misleading conclusions.
The current study attempts to further the literature in two ways. First, we con-
struct a measure that incorporates the most important design features of an RPS and
therefore more accurately assesses the strength of an RPS; secondly, we perform a
panel data analysis and demonstrate how misleading conclusions might result when
the heterogeneity of design is ignored or over-simplified as has been done in previous
studies.
3.3 Background
RPS policies, which are the central focus of this paper, differ from other policies
designed to incentivize renewable energy installation and generation, in that they are
essentially minimum quantity mandates, though with varying degrees of flexibility.
All strive to ensure that a minimum amount of renewable energy is included in the
portfolio of electric generating resources serving the state. Furthermore, all the RPS
policies we examine here clearly specify the path of the requirement over time, and
generally build to a final standard at some distant point in the future (for example,
Michigan’s RPS, passed in October 2008, has an ultimate target of 10 percent by
2015, with intermediate requirements of 2 percent by 2012, 3.3 percent by 2013, and
5 percent by 2014).
The fact that these requirements are written into the laws themselves provides
researchers with an obvious measure for the strength of an RPS; we refer to this as
the nominal requirement.5 Although straightforward, using nominal requirement as
5This, to a certain extent, is the approach taken by Kneifel (2008). Kneifel (2008) takes the
target requirement in a number of years after enactment, and linearly interpolates backwards to the
enactment date of the policy to obtain the requirement for each year after enactment. For example,
a policy enacted in 1996 with a sales requirement of 1.0% beginning in 2000 would be linearly
interpolated to be 0.2% in 1996 and increase by 0.2% each year until it reaches 1.0% in 2000.
We argue that this is a strong and ultimately unnecessary assumption. First, all states stipulate
the requirement to be enforced in every year until the ultimate goal is reached, and these do not
generally follow linear patterns. Second, given the large fixed costs associated with renewable energy
generation and the learning curves often thought to accompany renewable energy development, it’s
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a measure neglects a sizeable amount of policy heterogeneity that could potentially
have significant impact on the strength of an RPS. Previous research on RPS design
(Berry and Jaccard, 2001; Wiser et al., 2005, 2007; Wiser and Barbose, 2008) suggests
that the heterogeneity in three distinct dimensions have the greatest importance. We
examine each in turn, and discuss how we account for them in our analysis.
3.3.1 Coverage
Wiser et al. (2005) have argued that a well-designed RPS should ideally apply
equally and fairly to all load-serving entities in a state. However, in practice, there
are vast differences in coverage, as different types of utilities are treated differently
by some of the policies. For example, in Maryland and five other states (Iowa, Texas,
Hawaii, Minnesota and Wisconsin), all utilities, including investor-owned utilities,
power marketers, rural cooperatives, and municipal cooperatives, are required to
comply. However, other states have provided partial exemptions in meeting RPS
requirements, either to entire classes of utilities, or in some cases, to individual util-
ities. In Montana, the RPS applies only to investor-owned utilities, which generate
only 45 percent of the electricity that is sold in the state. Five other states (Con-
necticut, Pennsylvania, Arizona, Illinois and Colorado) have exemptions of a similar
magnitude, such that less than 60 percent of the electricity market in those states is
covered by the respective RPS policy.
3.3.2 Existing Capacity
Another design feature that could affect the effectiveness of RPS is whether the
RPS allows generation from existing renewable resources to fulfill the requirements,
or whether the standard must be filled with generation from new investments in
not clear why we should expect producers to develop renewable capacity in a linear manner, even in
years when the time path of the requirement is not explicitly laid out. In this paper, we start from
the actual scheduled requirements in each state.
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renewable resources. These obviously have different effects - requiring new resources
creates a stronger incentive for new development. Allowing generation from existing
assets to “count” will weaken the incentive, and furthermore may allow windfall
profits to accrue to those utilities that own existing renewable generating capacity.
States vary greatly in this aspect. While some states, including Arizona, Mas-
sachusetts, Montana, and Vermont, only allow generation from new assets to count
towards the policy, most states allow generation from all units that existed at the time
the legislation was passed. Many states, including Delaware, Maine, North Caroline,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Virginia, and Washington, allow
generation from some, but not all, existing units. For example, Washington’s RPS
states, “New renewable generation resources are defined as having first gone into com-
mercial operation after 12/31/97. Renewable generation units that entered service
before that date may not account for more than 1 percent of total retail electricity
sales in any compliance year.” When eligible existing capacity is large compared to
RPS requirements, the strength of an RPS would be significantly overstated if we used
the nominal requirement as the main measure, because the policy-induced incentive
to install new renewable generating capacity is relatively small.
In order to take into account the heterogeneity in coverage and existing capacity,
and thus more accurately capture the size of the new incentive generated by these
policies, we propose a new variable, INCRQMTSHARE:
INCRQMTSHAREit =
NOMINALit ∗ COV ERAGEit ∗ SALESit − EXISTINGiT
SALESit
(3.1)
where NOMINALit is the nominal requirement in state i in year t, COV ERAGEit
is the proportion of sales of the utility industry in state i covered by the RPS at time
t, SALESit is the total retail sales in state i in year t, and EXISTINGiT is the
renewable generation in year T that, if generated in later years, would be eligible to
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fulfill the RPS requirement in state i. T is the date the RPS legislation or mandate is
enacted.6 This new variable, INCRQMTSHARE, thus represents the “incremental
percentage requirement”, or the mandated increase in renewable generation in terms
of the percentage of all generation. For the remainder of the paper we refer to it as
the incremental requirement.
One key challenge in deriving INCRQMTSHARE is to calculate EXISTINGiT ,
the amount of eligible existing renewable generation. The difficulty is due to the fact
that state policies differ not only in whether existing capacity is eligible, but also
in which technologies are counted as “renewable”. We calculate this variable state
by state based on each state’s definition of “renewable”.7 Thus, three cases arise
in the calculation of EXISTING: (1) when existing capacity/generation is not al-
lowed, EXISTING = 0, but (2) when all existing capacity/generation is allowed,
EXISTING is equal to the renewable generation from existing capacity in period T .
However, in the third case, when states allow existing generation only in certain cases,
we need to take a case-by-case approach. For example, in the state of Washington
(mentioned above), we define existing renewable generation as the renewable genera-
tion in year 2006 from plants installed between 1998 and 2006 (the year Washington
passed its RPS) plus the minimum of either (a) the 2006 renewable generation from
plants installed in or before 1997 or (b) 1% of electricity sales in 2006.8
6If a policy was passed during the first six months of the year, T is set to the previous year,
otherwise T is the year in which the policy was passed. Regardless of how T is set, we always
consider the RPS to become “active”, in the sense that it enters into the decision-maker’s calculus,
in year T + 1.
7Note that this state-by-state calculation that take varying technologies into account is only
performed for the variable EXISTING. For the dependent variable, we use a uniform definition of
renewable technologies that is explained below.
8We recognize that there is an implicit assumption that the amount of generation from existing
capacity will continue to be the same for every year after T . This could be violated if renewable
capacity is decommissioned after year T , or if, for example, renewable capacity was “online”, but not
operating at full capacity in years prior to T . However, given the relative newness of most renewable
generating capacity and the low operating costs associated with most renewable technologies, this
assumption should have minimal effects, whether on our proposed measures or our regression results.
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3.3.3 REC trading
Most RPS policies are enforced through a credit-trading mechanism. When elec-
tricity is generated from a renewable source in states that have a renewable energy
credit program, there are two resulting products - the electrons that are fed into the
grid, and the environmental attributes associated with producing reduced-carbon or
carbon-free electricity. In most states, these environmental attributes are accounted
for in the form of renewable energy credits, or REC’s. Each REC represents one
megawatt hour (MWh) of electricity generated from an eligible renewable energy
resource. In some cases, the REC’s are bundled with the electricity that they are
associated with - this is often the case when an independent power producer has
contracted, ex ante, to sell the electricity to a given utility. But in some cases, the
REC’s are instead retained by the independent power producer, and presumably are
sold at a later point in time. At the end of a compliance year, the administrator of
the program calculates each utility’s required amount of renewable generation, based
both on the legislated percentage and the share of the state’s sales belonging to that
utility. A utility then has a specified amount of time to purchase the REC’s necessary
to meet its requirement if it is “short”. Treatment of REC’s varies across states, and
the way these REC’s are treated should result in variation of the impact of an RPS
policy.
• Some states, including California, Iowa, Illinois and Hawaii, simply do not allow
REC trading or out-of-state REC trading. In these states, the obligated utilities
are required to meet a certain standard through their own generation or through
power purchase agreements.
• Some states allow out-of-state REC’s, but heavily incentivize in-state genera-
tion. This is usually done either by creating set-asides, where a certain portion
of a utility’s obligation must be met with in-state REC’s, or multipliers, where
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in-state REC’s get extra credit. For example, in Arizona, a MWh of electricity
generated from in-state renewable capacity is credited as 1.5 REC’s, whereas
the same amount of electricity generated out-of-state is credited as normal.
• Some states impose very restrictive conditions on the eligibility of out-of-state
renewable generation, which in essence disallows out-of-state generation. For
example, in Texas, out-of-state resources are technically eligible to generate
Texas REC’s, but the output of the facility must be readily capable of being
physically metered and verified in Texas by the program administrator.
• Finally, some states allow free trade of REC’s and provide no preferential treat-
ment to in-state REC’s.
RPS policies that fall into the first three categories listed above are presumably
adopting such provisions in an effort to ensure that any economic and environmental
benefits (for example, avoided emissions or “green jobs”) resulting from RPS passage
do not leak across the border to other states. Without these in-state constraints, util-
ities may purchase either renewable electricity or REC’s from out-of-state resources,
therefore mitigating the strength of an RPS in promoting in-state renewable devel-
opment.9
3.3.4 Penalty or Alternative Compliance Payment
Another design difference among state RPSs is the treatment of non-compliant
energy producers. Some RPS policies, including those in Texas, California, Connecti-
cut, Montana, Washington and Wisconsin, explicitly impose a financial penalty for
noncompliance. For example, in Texas, any utility that fails to meet its obligations
under the RPS must pay a penalty equal to the lesser of $50 or 200% of the average
9Some analysts (see, e.g., Wiser 2006) have raised the possibility that imposing in-state-
requirements may raise the question of violating U.S. Constitution’s Interstate Commerce Clause.
This is a valid concern but beyond the scope of this paper.
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cost of credits traded during the year for each MWh it falls short. In some other
states10, the RPS instead establishes a mechanism called an Alternative Compliance
Payment (ACP), which serves a similar function. For example, in Massachusetts, a
retail electricity supplier may meet its RPS obligations (in whole or in part) for any
compliance year by making an ACP, rather than by investing in renewable capacity
or purchasing REC’s. The ACP rate was set at $50 dollars per MWh for 2003, and
in each subsequent compliance year, the state’s Department of Energy Resources is
required to adjusted the rate up or down according to the previous year’s Consumer
Price Index11. While they are expressed in different terms, explicit penalties and
ACP’s should, one expects, have similar effects - they both effectively set a cap on
the cost of complying with the RPS. In most of the states that have either an explicit
penalty or ACP in place, the level of financial incentive for compliance is of a sim-
ilar magnitude to those of Texas and Massachusetts12. However, nearly half of the
states13 with RPS policies have no such financial mechanisms.
The effect of an ACP or penalty on the effectiveness of an RPS in driving invest-
ment in in-state renewable capacity is unclear. One might think that the explicit
specification of either a penalty or ACP gives the RPS “teeth”: it makes explicit the
consequences for a utility who fails to meet its RPS obligations, and thus provides
strong incentives to comply with the RPS. However, an explicit penalty or ACP also
establishes an upper bound to the negative consequences of non-compliance - it ren-
ders the regulatory contract more complete, and thus in a sense limits the downside
risk to the utility who chooses not to comply.
10As of February, 2009, these include MA, ME, WI, NJ, RI, PA, MD, DC, DE, and NH.
11The adjusted ACP rate for 2008 is $58.58 per MWh.
12Two states that have this mechanism charge amounts significantly lower than the others, who
generally charge around $50 per MWh. The penalty in Montana is $10 per MWH, and in Maryland,
the ACP is either $15 or $20, depending on the ‘technology tier’. The findings reported in this paper
do not depend on whether or not we treat Montana and Maryland as having a penalty/ACP.
13These include IA, MN, NV, AZ, NM, CO, NY, HI, VT, IL, VA, NC, MO, and OR.
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3.4 Empirical Framework
The primary objective of this paper is to determine the effectiveness of state-
level RPS policies in incentivizing investment in new renewable energy. Alternatively
put, to what extent can the recent growth in renewable capacity in the 50 states be
attributed to RPS policies?
In order to accurately answer this question, we exploit a lengthy panel of data that
allows us to control for unobserved state and year heterogeneity. This is akin to a
change-in-changes approach - with state and year fixed effects we control for existing
differences among the states as well as exogenous technological progress, giving us
consistent coefficient estimates. We estimate several models of the form
RENEWSHARECAPit = αi + γt + ξZit + δWit + βxit + eit (3.2)
where RENEWSHARECAP is the percentage of generating capacity in a state that
is non-hydro renewable, αi represents a state-specific intercept, γt represents year fixed
effects, Zit represents other state policies that are designed to encourage renewable
investment, and Wit represents various social and economic variables that might have
an impact on the development of renewable energy. Finally, xit is a measure for
the RPS policy that varies both within and between states. In some specifications,
we interact xit with one of three variables thought to impact the effectiveness of an
RPS; one is a dummy variable indicating the existence of an in-state requirement,
the second is a dummy indicating that the RPS contains a penalty or ACP, and the
third is a measure of how dependent a state is on electricity generated in other states.
Because the error terms are likely to be correlated across time within a state, and
because we expect the variance to differ by state, we estimate standard errors that
are clustered at the state level.
We construct our dependent variable, the percentage of generating capacity in a
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state that is non-hydro renewable (RENEWSHARECAP ), using data we discuss
in the next section. xit takes different forms in different specifications; in addition to
the nominal requirement and incremental requirement measures discussed above, we
also use
• RPS - a binary variable that equals 1 if a mandatory RPS law is effective in a
given year, and 0 otherwise.14 If the legality of an RPS was in dispute (as was
the case in IA until 1997), we set RPS=0. This is similar to the measure used
in Menz and Vachon (2006) and Adelaja and Hailu (2008).
• RPSTREND - a state-wise cumulative sum of RPS, denoting the number
of years that the RPS has been in effect.15 Menz and Vachon (2006) use an
analogous measure in some specifications.
In addition to RPS policies, states have also developed and implemented many
other policy instruments to encourage installation of renewable generation. We in-
clude the following alternative policies in Zit as controls.
• One popular alternative policy is known as a mandatory green power option,
under which each utility in the state is required by law to offer its customers
the choice of opting to “buy” green power. Consumers opt to pay a premium on
their electricity bills, and then the utility must procure enough generating assets
or RECs to provide an amount of renewable electricity equal to the amount
purchased by those consumers who have chosen this option. MGPOPTION
is a binary variable that equals 1 if such a law exists in that state and year. As
of April 2009, eight states have a mandatory green power option law.
14We set RPS=1 if the law became effective on or before June 30 of that year. This is the coding
rule we adopted for any policies evaluated in this paper. We also experimented with setting this
variable equal to 1 if an RPS had just been passed, rather than in effect, and found qualitatively
similar results.
15To date, no RPS has been repealed.
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• Another type of policy designed to encourage development of renewable electric-
ity is known as a public benefits fund. These are state-level funds established
and maintained by the state public utility commissions in order to support en-
ergy efficiency and renewable energy projects. The funds are collected either by
charging consumers a small amount, or by requiring payments from the utilities
themselves. PUBBENFUND is a binary variable that equals 1 if, in a given
year, a state maintains a public benefits fund that has as part of its mandate
the support of renewable energy projects, and 0 otherwise. As of late 2008, 19
states maintain a public benefits fund that supports renewable energy.
• A third type of policy designed to encourage development of renewable electric-
ity is called net metering. Net metering allows for the flow of electricity from
consumer-sited installations back to the grid, so that excess generation at such
installations can defray the cost of a customer’s bill. These laws provide an
additional incentive for small, customer-sited generation. NETMETERING
is a binary variable that equals 1 if, in a given year, a state has a net-metering
law on the books. As of late 2008, 42 states have such a law in place.
• The last type of policy we control for in this paper is referred to as intercon-
nection standards. These are standards that facilitate the contracting process,
making it easier, at both the technical and procedural level, for customer-sited
generation to be installed. INTERCONSTAND is a binary variable that
equals 1 if a state has codified interconnection standards to facilitate customer-
sited renewable energy installation. As of late 2008, 37 states had such laws on
their books.
Besides these policy variables, we also include some social and economic variables
in the regression analysis, as they might be thought to have either a direct impact on
the development of renewable energy, or indirectly by making the adoption of RPS
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policies more likely.
• Electricity Price. Electricity price, ELECPRICE, could influence demand for
renewable energy resources. On one hand, high electricity prices may reflect
the need for the state to seek out alternative energy sources and ensure a viable
long-term energy supply, implying that such states would be more likely to
develop renewable energy. On the other hand, it may be more difficult to pass
on the extra costs of shifting to renewable energy to customers when electricity
prices are already high. This suggests that renewable energy could face more
resistance in states with high electricity prices. The predicted sign of the overall
effect is ambiguous. We use lagged prices so that this regressor is predetermined
with respect to the dependent variable.
• State Income. The transition to renewable energy may cause an increase in
electricity prices. States with higher incomes will be more capable of affording
the increased price, and therefore are presumably more likely to develop renew-
able resources. To account for this, we include the median income for 4-person
families in each state from 1993 to 2006 in the analysis, which is denoted as
STATEINC.
• League of Conservation Voters (hereafter, LCV) Scores. In states where citi-
zens have stronger environmental preferences, there may be higher demand for
renewable energy development. Following previous studies (e.g. Maxwell et al.
2000), we use the average LCV scores of Senators and Representatives in each
state, LCV SCORE, as a proxy for the environmental preferences of the citizens
in the state. Each year, the LCV selects environmental issues that exemplify
the environmental agenda with the help of a panel comprising the main U.S.
environmental groups. The organization then creates an index by counting the
number of times each representative or senator in Congress votes favorably for
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the “environmental agenda” (e.g., tropical forest conservation or fighting global
climate change). The index ranges from 0 to 100, with 100 representing a record
of voting with the environmental agenda in all cases.
• Net import of electricity. A state that is heavily dependent on the import of
electricity may have stronger incentives to develop renewable energy to increase
the diversity of its energy mix and reduce its energy dependence. To take
this confounding factor into account, we include IMPORTRATIO, a lagged





In some specifications, we include the interaction term between IMPORTRATIO
and INCRQMTSHARE to see whether a state’s response to an RPS depends on
the relative abundance of its existing electricity supply.
We include RECFREETRADE in some regressions. This is a binary variable
that equals 1 if two conditions are met: (1) the state allows its RPS obligations to
be met with REC’s, and (2) it treats out-of-state REC’s no differently from in-state
REC’s. This variable equals 0 either if the RPS does not allow REC trading, or if it
allows only or strongly favors in-state REC trading16. We include this binary variable
and its interaction with INCRQMTSHARE in order to evaluate the extent to which
imposing an in-state-requirement renders an RPS less effective in promoting in-state
renewable energy development. In some specifications, we also include NEIGHBOR,
which is meant to capture the size of the new market for renewables resulting from
RPS implementation in neighboring states. This will allow us to control for possible
16Or, of course, if the state does not have an RPS policy.
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where A denotes the number of states adjacent to state i, and INCRQMTat is the
numerator of equation (3.1) for state a.
Finally, we include PENALTY ACP in some regressions. This also is a binary
variable which is equal to 1 if either penalty or ACP is to be imposed in case of
noncompliance and 0 otherwise. We include this binary variable and its interaction
with INCRQMTSHARE in order to evaluate to what extent providing a financial
penalty or ACP may render an RPS more or less effective in promoting in-state
renewable energy development.
3.5 Data
In this section, we describe the data that is used to create the measures laid out
in Section 3.3 and to perform the analysis described in section 3.4.
As discussed above, one key contribution of this paper is the development of a
new measure for the strength of an RPS. Once this variable is constructed, we can
compare our measure with the more commonly used “nominal” measure. For this
purpose, the key task is to calculate INCRQMTSHAREit as defined in equation
(1), which requires information on each state’s electricity market and RPS policies.
For variables measuring the relative size of the electricity industry in each state,
SALESit, we employ publicly-available data on electricity sales (EIA-861) from the
Energy Information Administration (EIA). EIA data is also critical in the construc-
tion of existing eligible renewable generation, EXISTINGiT . We obtain annual
generation data at the generating unit level from the EIA-906 data files.
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We construct an analogous measure based on generation rather than capacity, and
refer to it as RENEWSHAREGEN . This is used primarily in our interpretation
of the coefficients (see the Results section); it is less suitable as a dependent variable
because the EIA altered its definition of renewable energy in 2000. To code the RPS
policies, we use data from a variety of sources. The Union of Concerned Scientists
(hereafter, UCS) maintains a database17 on the design and implementation of exist-
ing state standards. Another excellent database that was very helpful in our data
collection efforts was DSIRE, the Database of State Incentives for Renewable En-
ergy.18 We referred to both databases in our coding of the RPS variables, and when
necessary, referred to the actual legislation and/or public utility commission rules
to resolve any discrepancies or missing information. The variables PENALTY ACP
and RECFREETRADE, described above, are based on information contained in
these sources. Other RPS-related variables include:
• NOMINALit, the nominal percentage requirement as written into the law.
Every RPS law has an explicitly defined requirement path that evolves over the
years. For the handful of states for which the law is coded in absolute capacity
terms, rather than as a percentage of generation, we multiply by a constant,
called a capacity conversion factor19, that accounts for the intermittent nature
of the most popular renewable technologies, then divide by retail sales in a given
year, in order to convert this variable to be in the same units across all of our
data.
• COV ERAGEit, the proportion of retail sales in a state-year that can be at-
17http://go.ucsusa.org/cgi-bin/RES/state standards search.pl?template=main
18http://www.dsireusa.org
19These state-specific capacity conversion factors are often either explicitly written into the legis-
lation, as is the case in TX, or implicit from the history of the RPS, as is the case in IA, where part
of the afore-mentioned legal dispute centered around the question of whether 105 MW of wind would
satisfy the RPS, or whether 260 MW – an amount of renewable generation that would displace 105
MW of conventional capacity – was required under the law. When the capacity conversion factor
was not available, we used 0.35.
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tributed to entities that are required to comply with the RPS. We use EIA-861
data to calculate the proportion of retail sales in each state that are undertaken
by each utility or class of utility.20 These weights are then combined with data
from the laws themselves in order to obtain this variable.
• EXISTINGiT , is the amount of renewable generation in the year prior to
the enactment of the RPS policy. We decide what types of existing renewable
generation are eligible from the UCS and DSIRE database, and then refer to
generating unit level data from EIA-906 in order to aggregate generation from
existing eligible plants in year T.
We derive INCRQMTSHAREit based on equation 3.1. We finish with a bal-
anced panel of 50 ∗ 14 = 700 observations, one for each state-year from 1993 to 2006.
Table 3.1 shows nominal requirements and incremental requirements in 2006 for the
16 states that had a binding standard in that year. The differences between nominal
requirement and incremental requirement are striking. We also rank the states based
on nominal requirement and incremental requirement, and the correlation between
either the measures themselves or their respective ranks is not statistically different
from zero. The two measures are clearly not synonymous.
This table clearly demonstrates the potential pitfalls if the incorrect measure of
policy stringency is applied in empirical analysis surrounding questions of RPS im-
pact, regardless of the dependent variable. We argue that our new measure is more
accurate, as it explicitly accounts for several key design features that affect the ef-
fectiveness of an RPS. It is not hard to imagine that studies on the effectiveness of
RPS policies will be highly dependent on the choice of measure employed. Figure
3.1 illustrates this point more vividly. In two states that have the strictest nominal
requirements, Maine and California, the passage of an RPS appears to have had little
20We find minimal change in these shares over the 7 years for which we have data, so we use 2006
data to construct these weights.
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Table 3.1: Comparison of Measures of RPS Stringency in 2006
Nominal Incremental Rank of Nominal Rank of Incremental
State Requirement Requirement Requirement Requirement
ME 30% 0 1 14
CA 14.31% 0 2 14
HI 8% 1.02 3 8
NV 6% 0.38 4 12
WI 5.69% 1.23 5 7
NM 5% 4.33 6 1
NJ 4.58% 2.77 7 3
MN 4.36% 2.77 8 2
TX 2.04% 1.62 9 6
MA 2% 1.72 11 5
CT 2% 1.8 10 4
PA 1.5% 0 12 14
AZ 1.05% 0.62 13 10
MD 1% 0.05 14 13
IA 0.86% 0.67 15 9
NY 0.81% 0.49 16 11
positive impact on the amount of renewable capacity in the state. After Maine’s first
RPS (with a 30% requirement) was written into law in September 1997, the renewable
capacity decreased. In California, an RPS was passed in September 2002, mandating
that 20% of the state’s electricity generation be renewables-based by 2010. Yet the
growth thereafter appears to be a simple continuation of the pre-existing trend. In
contrast, for the two states that rank as No. 1 and No. 2 based on incremental
requirement, New Mexico and Minnesota, passage of an RPS appears to have had a
strong and positive impact. New Mexico passed an RPS with gradually increasing re-
quirements (starting in 2005) in December 2002, and shortly thereafter we see the first
significant installation of renewable capacity in that state. Similarly, in Minnesota,
a series of laws mandating installation of renewable capacity was passed starting in
1994. We see jumps in capacity in 1998, 2001, 2002, and 2006, all years in which the
binding requirements increased.





































































































































Figure 3.1: Growth of Renewable Capacity in Selected States
and other measures of policy stringency. While Figure 3.1 is certainly illustrative,
the econometric analysis in the following section includes all states and controls for
other policy changes and factors that could also have an impact on our outcome
variable. The dependent variable, RENEWSHARECAP , is the share of capacity
in a state-year that is based on non-hydro renewable technology. Using EIA-906, we
build yearly data files that include all plants that were online in a given year, from
1990 to 2006. We count the capacity of all plants whose primary energy source is
classified as non-hydro renewable by EIA. This includes wind, geothermal, and solar
generating units, as well as several types of biomass. We then divide by the total
capacity in a state for that year to obtain RENEWSHARECAP .
Information on policies other than RPS is retrieved from DSIRE. For social and
economic control variables, data on electricity prices21, generation22, and consump-
tion23 are obtained from the Energy Information Administration, data on state income






the League of Conservation Voters25. Summary statistics of the data used in the
regression analysis are provided in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
RENEWSHARECAP 2.39 3.71 0 27.36
RPS 0.16 0.37 0 1
RPSTREND 0.7 1.97 0 13
NOMINAL 0.57 3.22 0 30
INCRQMTSHARE 0.07 0.32 0 4.33
MGPOPTION 0.03 0.17 0 1
PUBBENFUND 0.16 0.37 0 1
NETMETERING 0.35 0.48 0 1
INTERCONSTAND 0.17 0.38 0 1
ELECPRICE 7.07 2.16 3.43 18.33
LCV SCORE 44.8 27.21 0 100
STATEINC 57.56 11.46 32.59 94.44
POWERIMPORT -0.26 0.63 -3.04 0.61
RECFREETRADE 0.05 0.21 0 1
PENALTY ACP 0.09 0.29 0 1
NEIGHBOR 0.28 1.72 0 19.59
3.6 Estimation Results
Table 3.3 presents results from several estimations of equation 3.2, and highlights
how the estimates of the effectiveness of an RPS are highly dependent on the coding
scheme chosen. When the RPS is introduced into the estimation model as a simple
binary variable that is turned on when “treatment” is administered, or as a cumu-
lative count of the years a given state has been subject to this treatment, we obtain
coefficients on RPS that are not significantly different from 0, as shown in the first
two columns of Table 3.3. This result suggests that RPS policies are ineffective in
accelerating renewable energy, which is consistent with Michaels (2007)’s claim that
RPS policies are largely symbolic.
25http://www.lcv.org
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Table 3.3: Measures of RPS and the Impact of an RPS on Renewable Electricity
Investment









MGPOPTION 3.197 3.254 2.959 2.994
(0.582)** (0.719)** (0.706)** (0.504)**
PUBBENFUND -0.467 -0.437 0.115 -0.547
(0.535) (0.456) (0.258) (0.58)
NETMETERING -0.713 -0.748 -0.557 -0.652
(0.438) (0.562) (0.219)* (0.43)
INTERCONSTAND 0.47 0.5 0.344 0.404
(0.503) (0.609) (0.25) (0.505)
ELECPRICE -0.097 -0.091 0.138 -0.116
(0.108) (0.113) (0.104) (0.101)
LCV SCORE -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
STATEINC 0.01 0.012 0.01 -0.001
(0.03) (0.036) (0.026) (0.025)
IMPORTRATIO 2.185 2.148 1.376 2.215
(0.965)* (0.800)** (0.392)** (0.928)*
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 700 700 700 700
R-squared 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.95
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Fixed effects regressions; in all specifications the dependent variable
is the percentage of a state’s electricity generating capacity that is
based on renewable technology.
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In column 3 of Table 3.3, we instead allow the effect of the RPS policy to be
a function of the nominal requirement. As discussed above, this method has two
shortcomings, in that it ignores exemptions from the RPS and it includes generation
expected from existing capacity that may be eligible under the policy. So if a state
introduces an RPS that is already being met, and new non-renewable capacity is
erected in the state (causing the renewable share of capacity to drop), we could
actually see a negative impact. This is in fact what we observe – the coefficient on
NOMINAL is negative and significant.26
However, in column 4 of Table 3, we instead specify that the renewable share of
capacity is a function of the “incremental requirement” associated with an RPS policy.
As discussed above, this measure is a much more accurate indicator of the strength
of an RPS. Under this specification, we get a much more intuitively appealing result
- the coefficient on INCPCTRQMT is positive and significant. We interpret this
coefficient as follows - an RPS that mandates that the utilities serving a state increase
the renewable share of generation by 1 percentage point will result, on average, in a
0.56 percentage point increase in the share of capacity that is classified as non-hydro
renewable. We adopt these results as our preferred baseline specification.
In assessing this coefficient, a couple of points bear mentioning. First, because of
the intermittent nature of some types of renewable capacity, one might expect that a
1 percentage point increase in generation should actually be associated with a much
greater increase in capacity. However, a non-trivial portion of the renewable gener-
ation produced in a given year is undertaken at facilities that are not classified by
EIA as “renewable”. These include, for example, natural gas plants that occasionally
26This negative result (as well as the comparatively high R-squared measure) is driven by Maine,
where the situation described above actually occurred. In 1997, Maine passed an RPS whose nominal
requirement (which took effect in 2000) was already easily met by its existing eligible resources.
In 2000-2001, Maine brought several new natural gas plants online, while two biomass plants were
retired. Estimating the regression in column 3 without Maine results in a coefficient on NOMINAL
that is statistically indistinguishable from 0. The rest of the results presented in the paper are
insensitive to the exclusion of Maine.
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use landfill gas as a fuel, or coal plants that occasionally use biomass. A demeaned
regression of Percentage of Renewable Generation on Percentage of Renewable Ca-
pacity yields a coefficient of about 0.68, suggesting that if an RPS was the sole force
in driving renewable development, was perfectly enforced, and was met with only
in-state capacity, we would expect a coefficient of about 1.47.
There are a number of possible explanations for why the coefficient we observe
is significantly less than 1.47. The most obvious are (1) that the policies are not
being fully enforced, (2) that utilities find it in their interest to comply through the
payment of penalties rather than by installing new capacity or acquiring RECs, (3)
that most states are complying with the RPS by purchasing out-of-state RECs, or
(4) that much of the renewable development we see is being driven either by other
policies or by changes in technology that are affecting both RPS and non-RPS states.
Unfortunately, our analysis does not allow us to address precisely why the coefficient
is less than 1.47.
With regards to other policy variables, it is interesting to note that on average, the
mandatory green power option has both an immediate and persistent impact on the
renewable share of capacity in a state. The coefficient for MGPOPTION is positive
and significant regardless of how RPS is measured. A more surprising set of results is
the negative and occasionally significant coefficients on the variables associated with
both the public benefits fund and the net metering policy alternatives. The only
non-policy variable that has a significant coefficient is IMPORTRATIO, a finding
which suggests that states that experience an increase in the import of electricity
have acted more aggressively in developing renewable energy in subsequent years.
In column 1 of Table 3.4, we add the interaction term between IMPORTRATIO
and INCRQMTSHARE to our baseline specification, and obtain a coefficient that
is not statistically different from 0. This suggests that RPS policy success, as defined
for the purpose of this paper, does not depend on the size of a state’s electricity
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supply, relative to its demand.
Table 3.4: RPS Design and the Impact of an RPS on Renewable Investment
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5
INCRQMTSHARE 0.492 1.011 0.677 0.557 0.931
(0.219)* (0.307)** (0.155)** (0.188)** (0.251)**
MGPOPTION 2.983 2.896 2.876 2.994 2.685
(0.504)** (0.481)** (0.531)** (0.518)** (0.463)**
PUBBENFUND -0.525 -0.566 -0.34 -0.547 -0.242
(0.594) (0.608) (0.476) (0.609) (0.452)
NETMETERING -0.664 -0.625 -0.612 -0.651 -0.693
(0.425) (0.459) (0.397) (0.437) (0.426)
INTERCONSTAND 0.422 0.36 0.366 0.404 0.447
(0.499) (0.554) (0.467) (0.504) (0.511)
ELECPRICE -0.113 -0.131 -0.085 -0.116 -0.06
(0.101) (0.101) (0.102) (0.102) (0.116)
LCV SCORE -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
STATEINC 0.002 -0.003 0.013 -0.001 0.016
(0.024) (0.023) (0.031) (0.023) (0.026)
IMPORTRATIO 2.206 2.201 2.238 2.216 2.145
(0.936)* (0.901)* (0.975)* (0.911)* (0.888)*




RECFREETRADE ∗ INCRQMTSHARE -0.71 -1.529
(0.357)+ (0.503)**
PENALTY ACP -0.937 -1.744
(0.729) (1.177)




Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 700 700 700 700 700
R-squared 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
Wald test p-value 0.11 0.12 0.04
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Fixed effects regressions; in all specifications the dependent variable is the percentage of a state’s
electricity generating capacity that is based on renewable technology. The Wald test p-value row
gives the p-values on a test that the coefficients on the variables not included in the baseline
specification (Table 3.3, Column 4) are jointly equal to 0.
The impact of two RPS design features are examined in column 2 and 3 of Table
3.4. In column 2, we investigate the effect of how an RPS policy treats out-of-state
REC’s. We introduce RECFREETRADE and its associated interaction term into
our baseline specification. As one might expect, allowing out-of-state REC’s miti-
gates the effectiveness of the RPS significantly. The results suggest that a mandated
increase of 1 percentage point of the renewable share of generation will result, on
average, in a 1.01 percentage point increase in states that either prohibit or otherwise
discourage out-of-state RECs, and in a 0.30 percentage point increase in states that
59
place no restrictions on out-of-state RECs. A Wald test of this latter effect reveals
that the resulting impact is no longer significantly different from 0.27
In column 3, we investigate whether an RPS policy is rendered more or less ef-
fective by the existence of a penalty or ACP. We introduce PENALTY ACP and
its interaction term with INCRQMTSHARE into our baseline specification. Both
PENALTY ACP and its associated interaction term have a coefficient that is not
statistically different from 0. A Wald test of the joint significance of coefficients for
PENALTY ACP and PENALTY ACP ∗ INCRQMTSHARE yields a p-value of
0.12, slightly above conventional thresholds for statistical significance.
Column 4 of Table 3.4 introduces NEIGHBOR into the baseline specification; the
estimated coefficient is small and essentially no different from zero. This suggests that
the growth of renewable capacity in a state cannot be explained by increases in the
relative size of the renewable electricity market resulting from RPS implementation
in neighboring states.
Column 5 of Table 3.4 presents the results from a specification that includes all
variables used in the previous specifications of Table 3.4. The key insights are un-
changed, with the exception that the coefficient on the interaction between IMPORTRATIO
and INCRQMTSHARE is now significant. This suggests that compared to states
that are more energy self-sufficient, the impact of RPS policies is smaller in states that
rely on imported electricity. This finding is consistent with the idea that RPS policy
outcomes are dependent on the transmission infrastructure that exists in a state at
the time the RPS takes effect - states with a higher IMPORTRATIO will, more
often than not, also have in-state transmission grids that are constrained, meaning
that the addition of new in-state renewable resources will be more difficult.28 It is also
interesting to note that the baseline effect of INCRQMT is now 0.93, notably closer
27This interpretation assumes that a state’s RPS is already in place and is not altering its treatment
of out-of-state REC’s.
28Vajjhala et al (2008) explores the interdependence between transmission and renewable policy
success with a series of simulations.
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to the coefficient of 1.47 that we would expect if the RPS were perfectly enforced,
met with only in-state capacity, and perfectly binding.
Our analysis in this article treats all policies as exogenous, which is clearly a
very strong assumption that is unlikely to hold in practice. We acknowledge that
endogeneity is a valid concern. Accordingly, our analysis has included social and
economic variables thought to impact RPS adoption. However, we recognize that
this does not fully address endogeneity concerns. Work in progress by the authors
more thoroughly addresses issues of endogeneity and also investigates whether RPS
policies to date have led to an increase in electricity prices.
3.7 Conclusion
Existing empirical research on the impact of state-level RPS policies in the United
States has often taken a naive approach. This has usually included a cross-sectional
approach or the use of very blunt proxies for policies that are in fact very heteroge-
neous.
In this paper, we have introduced a new way to measure the stringency of renew-
able portfolio standards (RPS). We argue that it is a much better indicator of the
magnitude of the incentive provided by an RPS because it explicitly accounts for some
RPS design features that may have a significant impact on the strength of an RPS.
The difference between this new measure and other more commonly used measures is
striking; some seemingly aggressive RPS policies in fact provide only weak incentives,
while some seemingly moderate RPS policies are in fact relatively ambitious.
We also investigate the impacts of renewable portfolio standards on the renewable
electricity development in a state using our new measure of RPS stringency, and
compare the results with those when alternative measures are used. The difference in
the estimates is again striking. Using our new measure, we confirm that, on average,
RPS policies have had a significant and positive effect on in-state renewable energy
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development. These results cast doubt on the argument that the passage of RPS
policies has been purely symbolic, or that they have otherwise not been implemented.
These findings are masked when differences among RPS policies are ignored. We also
find evidence that another important design feature – allowing “free trade” of RECs
– can significantly weaken the impact of an RPS, and that the effectiveness of an
RPS is in part dependent on a state’s existing ‘balance of trade’ in electricity. It
should come as no surprise that the importance of digging into policy design details
is crucial when assessing policy effectiveness. These results should prove instructive
to policy makers, whether considering the development of a federal-level RPS or the
development or redesign of a state-level RPS.
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CHAPTER IV
Measuring the Impact of the Toxics Release
Inventory: Evidence from Manufacturing Plant
Births
4.1 Introduction
Pollution disclosure has often been called the third wave1 of environmental regu-
lation. After earlier emphases on command and control regulation and market-based
approaches, an increasing number of policies in an increasing number of jurisdictions
are focusing on information disclosure as a primary tool. This approach has gained
popularity partly because it doesn’t force policy-makers to pick technology winners
or impose uniform standards on firms and industries who face different costs of being
“clean” (as can be the case in command and control regulation). Nor does it rely
on a need to choose the “optimal” amount of pollution or optimal tax rates, as is
required of the most common market-based solutions. Instead, it relies on a Coasian
bargaining argument; if stakeholders and the general public value environmental at-
tributes and have adequate information as to the polluting activities of firms, then
the public can process this information via various channels, and impose costs or
otherwise give incentives for firms to achieve the right balance between “clean” and
1Tietenberg (1998)
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“dirty”. Incidentally, information provision is also generally less costly to administer
than the methods employed in the two previous waves of regulation, another factor
which undoubtedly plays a role in its proliferation as a policy tool.
The flagship example of a disclosure-based environmental policy is the Toxics
Release Inventory (TRI), a program which has existed for more than 20 years. Created
by the October 1986 passage of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act (EPCRA), the TRI is a publicly available database maintained by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that contains information on toxic chemical
releases and waste management activities reported annually by certain industries as
well as federal facilities. Industrial or federal facilities that either produce more than
25,000 pounds or handle more than 10,000 pounds of any of the more than 600 listed
toxic chemicals must provide detailed information on the treatment, recycling, or
release of these substances.2 Every year, the TRI typically contains approximately
80,000 facility-chemical reports from more than 20,000 different facilities.
Since the first TRI data became publicly available in June of 1989, it has given
rise to a vast body of anecdotal evidence suggesting that media, investors, workers,
industry, the government, and the general public have used TRI data to learn about
environmental risks and facility-level industrial performance. The EPA has docu-
mented more than 100 uses of the TRI data by government, businesses, and citizens
(U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2003), and several of these documented uses
have in turn led to increased efforts by companies to improve their environmental
performance (Hamilton, 2005).
However, statistical evidence that the introduction of a disclosure-based approach
led to systematic change in pollution outcomes is weak, due to the simple fact that the
data covered in the TRI were not recorded in any widespread way prior to the imple-
mentation of the program. Rather, the existing research on the TRI (e.g. Hamilton
2See Bennear (2008) for a thorough explanation of the factors that determine whether a facility
is subject to the TRI disclosure requirements.
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1995, Konar and Cohen 1996, Khanna et al. 1998, Bui and Mayer 2003, Oberholzer-
Gee and Mitsunari 2006) has focused either on the reaction of different stakeholders
to the release of information contained in the TRI, or the heterogeneity in improve-
ments in environmental performance during the early years of the TRI. However,
none have addressed the question of whether firms or plants were actually doing any-
thing differently in response to the existence of the TRI. This lack of an appropriate
counterfactual has made it very difficult to evaluate the impact of a disclosure-based
approach to environmental regulation.
Traditional environmental regulation is thought to have a direct effect on manu-
facturing outcomes (in established industries) in three ways:
• it can force incumbents in the affected industries to close;
• it can induce incumbent plants in the affected industries to operate in a more
environmentally-friendly way, either through changes in the production process
or through improvements in pollution abatement; or
• it can prevent, or otherwise dissuade, would-be establishments from entry, es-
pecially in the dirtiest industries.
This paper investigates the third pathway to affect manufacturing, entry deter-
rence. Accordingly, my empirical analysis investigates whether we observe a shift in
the patterns of new plant creation, or plant ‘births’ in the industrial sectors most likely
to be affected following the implementation of the TRI. Previous literature (Becker
and Henderson, 2000) has established a clear reduction in plant births in counties
affected by traditional command-and-control regulation, but the question of whether
a disclosure-based policy - which represents a very different approach - has similar
effects has not been answered. However, this benchmark for comparison is not the
only advantage to focusing on plant births; while from an environmental standpoint
one might think that the gains would be higher by closing an older, less efficient plant
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or changing the way these older plants operate, prevention of new plants from open-
ing in the region may be more realistic. Incumbent plants often have well-entrenched
political interests and also tend to be large employers within the community, both
of which can render political action against them more costly than action against
potential entrants.
I use unique establishment-level micro-data from the U.S. Census to address this
question. I find that in the counties that had the highest levels of toxic releases,
this distinction triggered a slight decrease in manufacturing plant births in high-
TRI sectors, and a simultaneous increase in the number of births in the cleanest
industries. Furthermore, I find that these average effects mask a significant amount
of heterogeneity in county-level ‘responses’ to the TRI, and I provide evidence that
the magnitude of these shifts are highly correlated with the prevailing income levels
in the county. The implications of these results are discussed in the Conclusion.
The remainder of this paper will be structured as follows. In section 2, I present
a brief background on the relevant institutions of environmental regulation in the
United States, while in section 3 I review the literature on the TRI and pollution
disclosure programs more broadly. In section 4, I provide more detail on the Census
data used here, while section 5 presents my empirical strategy to identify measurable
effects of the TRI on plant births. Section 6 presents the results and Section 7
concludes the paper.
4.2 Background
The institutions surrounding the regulation of pollution in the United States are
complicated. In order to provide a better understanding of the context under which
this disclosure-based approach to regulation was introduced, some aspects of the
relevant institutional landscape are useful to highlight.
I begin by presenting a brief history of the environmental regulation of industrial
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pollution in the U.S. in the period leading up to the passage of EPCRA and the
TRI. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 were the fifth major piece of federal
legislation relating to the reduction of air pollution since the original Air Pollution
Control Act of 1955. The 1977 Amendments led to major changes in the way air
pollution (though not toxic pollution3) was regulated in the United States. Under this
regulatory regime (which continues, with minor modifications, today), counties whose
ambient air quality is below federal standards for any of 6 “criteria” air pollutants
can be designated as “non-attainment” counties. The states where these counties are
located are required to develop State Implementation Plans that detail how these
counties will attain federal air quality standards within 10 years. The Act granted
the federal government the power to withhold federal highway funds or to impose
moratoria on new plant construction in recalcitrant states. The bill also gave the
federal government the power to impose civil penalties directly on polluters. The
key regulatory instrument targeting industrial facilities was technological controls
on equipment, under which both new and existing plants were subject to tighter
standards in non-attainment areas. In attainment areas, only new large plants were
subject to regulations.
The focus of EPCRA was very different. Motivation for increased federal regula-
tion of toxic chemicals was triggered by a tragic chemical accident in Bhopal, India,
in December 1984, and subsequent accidents in the U.S. that, while smaller in scale
than Bhopal, nonetheless suggested vulnerability to similar accidents. EPCRA’s pur-
pose was to encourage and support emergency planning at state and local levels and
to provide the public and government with information regarding possible risks from
toxic emissions. The portion of the Act relevant to this study is Section 313, which re-
quires industrial facilities that use, manufacture, or process above a threshold amount
3Toxic, or hazardous, pollutants, as opposed to conventional pollutants, are those pollutants that
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Figure 4.1: TRI Releases and Manufacturing GDP: USA, 1988-2005
of any of the listed toxic chemicals in a given year to provide detailed information on
the use and disposal of these chemicals to both the EPA and state officials by July 1
of the following year. This information is subsequently made available to the public,
and is known as the Toxics Release Inventory. Data from the first reporting year,
1987, was released on June 19, 1989. This reporting lag has persisted throughout the
period of the current study, with a given calendar year’s data being released in the
spring two years later.
The first two decades of the Toxics Release Inventory have coincided with a notice-
able decrease in the amount of reported TRI releases; total releases have decreased by
58.5% between 1988 and 2005.4 As Figure 4-1 indicates, this decrease has happened
despite an increase in real manufacturing GDP during the same period.
A typical year’s inventory contains approximately 80,000 facility-chemical reports
4While 1987 was the first year for which TRI data were collected, the data are generally regarded
as problematic in some respects (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1991). As a result, analysis that
examines decreases in TRI releases (e.g. Hamilton 1999) generally uses 1988 data as the baseline.
Bennear (2008) points out that the method of aggregation used by EPA in calculating these figures
assumes that a facility’s failure to report a given chemical means that the facility’s emissions of the
chemical were 0, where in several cases failure to report will be positive, but under the threshold.
She finds that up to 40% of the observed decline in reported toxic releases in Massachusetts may be
attributed to non-reporting due to the reporting thresholds.
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from over 20,000 facilities. These data are often aggregated to identify the most
highly-polluting facilities in various industries or geographic regions, or to benchmark
corporate environmental performance, either within an industry or within a firm over
time. The annual EPA reports on TRI5 also typically contain similar lists for the
“dirtiest” counties. The existence of these lists suggest that facilities face varying
degrees of public pressure to reduce toxic releases. These lists motivate the variation
I exploit for identification in my empirical analysis.
The TRI is comprised of self-reported estimated emissions, and previous researchers
have raised questions about its validity (see, e.g. Toffel and Marshall 2004). While
the degree to which the TRI data are accurate remains an open question, there is
a fair amount of quality control and verification before the data is released to the
public, a fact which should allay some of these concerns. I provide some more de-
tail on the data collection and verification process here. Facilities must file annual
reports on releases and waste treatment with EPA by July 1st of the following year.
The U.S. EPA then checks the data for consistency, ‘echoes’ the information back to
the facilities, allows facilities to make corrections or clarifications of errors, and will
refer the issue to an EPA Regional Office for further investigation if necessary.6 Each
EPA region also has a TRI enforcement program, which conducts a limited num-
ber of data quality inspections (of reporting facilities) and non-reporting inspections
(of facilities that are in TRI industries but did not report) each year. Violations,
whether stemming from late reporting, failure to report, or data quality issues, can
lead to penalties of $25,000 per day, per chemical, per violation, and possibly crim-
inal charges as well. The EPA routinely takes enforcement actions against facilities
that either fail to report or report data inaccurately,7 suggesting that the incentive to
5See, for example, the 1987 TRI Public Data Release (EPA 1989). The TRI data were initially
made available in paper reports, but eventually were also disseminated via CD-ROM’s and the EPA
website.
6EPA’s Region 5, which contains roughly one quarter of the facilities reporting to TRI, receives
“several hundred” such referrals per year (Codina, 26 October 2009).
7For example, in October 2009 EPA’s Region 9 levied a $194,000 fine in October 2009 against a
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provide truthful information is real. In addition, EPCRA allows citizens to file suit
for specified violations of the law, including reporting requirements.8
EPA has also conducted TRI data quality surveys, most recently in 1996, which
sent surveyors to several facilities to perform their own estimates of releases and other
toxic waste management activities. These reports conclude that the information
provided by respondents is generally fairly accurate. While facilities in the three
sectors assessed in 1996 underestimated releases by 28% on average, three of the
four previous surveys found that facility estimates were within 2.2%, on average, of
the site surveyor estimates (and that over-reporting is nearly as frequent as under-
reporting). These same surveys found that facilities correctly determined whether
or not a chemical used at the facility was above the reporting threshold between 93
and 95% of the time (where, again, over-reporting is nearly as common as under-
reporting).9
There are several anecdotal examples of the TRI data having been used by citi-
zen groups, non-governmental organizations, or local regulators to spur some of the
highest toxic emitters into reducing their toxic pollution, whether through citizen-led
information campaigns, guides produced by national environmental organizations, or
direct negotiation. After Calhoun County, Texas was highlighted by the initial TRI
report as the county with the highest level of toxic releases in the country, a commu-
nity group there used TRI data to build community awareness about local pollution,
eventually obtaining a commitment from Alcoa for aggressive pollution reduction ini-
tiatives at two local plants. Similarly, a group in Butler County, PA, which was among
the highest TRI counties for several years in the mid-to-late 1990’s, eventually pro-
California facility that failed to report TRI chemicals over a five-year period (see U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency 2009).
8See Gray (2002), p.55-59.
9It is also worth noting that despite any potential problems with TRI data, it has been widely
used in both the economics and management literature as a measure of environmental performance
(e.g. see Hamilton 1995, Konar and Cohen 1996, Khanna and Damon 1999, King and Lenox 2000,
and Maxwell et al. 2000).
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cured a commitment from the state to restrict the level of nitrates that a major steel
plant in the area was allowed to release into Connoquenessing Creek. The section 313
reporting requirements have also been cited as directly influencing firms that produce
and use TRI-designated chemicals, leading them to implement new emissions reduc-
tion initiatives (Baram et al. 1992, p.40; Hamilton 2005), sometimes even without
external pressure (Hamilton 2005, p.4).
The existence of the TRI is also credited with leading to further changes in fed-
eral law on toxic pollution. The first, known as the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990,
simply increased the reporting requirements of the TRI, mandating more information
on the steps taken by the companies to reduce their generation of toxic materials.
The second, passed in the same year is known as the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990 (CAAA90). These Amendments included provisions related to the regulation of
toxics, centered on requirements that the EPA develop maximum achievable control
technology (MACT) standards that all new and existing major source facilities would
eventually need to meet. The Water Quality Act of 1987 also established stricter
control of the release of toxic pollutants into bodies of water. None of the subse-
quent federal regulations appear to provide for any geographic heterogeneity in the
regulatory pressures faced by either new or incumbent manufacturing plants.
4.3 Literature Review
There is a growing literature on the effects of TRI and similar pollution disclosure
programs. I highlight those studies, as well as relevant studies from other strands of
the environmental economics literature, in this section.
4.3.1 The Toxics Release Inventory
The literature on the effects of the Toxic Release Inventory is sizeable, although
the focus has not been on manufacturing outcomes per se. Three noteworthy papers
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focus on the response of the financial markets, and whether that in turn had an
effect on firm environmental performance. Hamilton (1995) examines whether or
not the initial release of the TRI in 1989 was “news” to the media and investors,
and finds that (1) firms with higher releases of toxic chemicals were more likely to
have those releases covered by print journalists at some point that year and (2)
stockholders in firms that reported TRI pollution figures experienced negative and
statistically significant abnormal returns upon release of the information. Konar and
Cohen (1996) extend this line of research and find evidence that the 40 firms who
experienced the largest abnormal returns in 1989 saw weakly significant decreases in
releases per dollar of revenue between 1989 and 1992 while the average firm did not,
suggesting that the financial markets may provide incentives for firms to change their
environmental behavior. Khanna et al. (1998) also examine the effect of TRI releases
on financial market outcomes, and in most years find negative abnormal 1-day returns
for those firms reporting TRI releases. They also find that these losses are associated
with subsequent decreases in on-site releases.
There are also two noteworthy studies that examine to what extent the TRI
affected housing prices in the areas surrounding facilities that release toxic wastes.
Bui and Mayer (2003) find that declines in toxic releases are not related to any
political economy variables and that housing prices did not respond either to the
initial disclosure of toxic releases or subsequent decreases in reported toxic releases
over time. They suggest that this is evidence that the public may be unable to process
the complex information contained in the TRI, and that right-to-know laws may
not be the most effective form of regulation. Oberholzer-Gee and Mitsunari (2006)
perform a very similar study, though they focus on a different region (Pennsylvania
instead of Massachusetts) and look at a finer geographic level, using geo-coded data.
They find that home buyers did adjust their risk perceptions following the release of
the TRI, and that the amount of air releases near the home had an additional effect
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on prices after the pollution information became public.
4.3.2 Pollution Disclosure
Despite the fact that the effects of the TRI on firm behavior and pollution out-
comes are not fully understood, disclosure programs have continued to proliferate as
alternatives to traditional environmental regulation in both developed and develop-
ing countries. The theoretical basis for this type of program is derived from Coase
(1960), who author argues that with well-defined property rights, coupled with trade-
ability of the externality and no transaction costs, efficient pollution levels should
be reached. Resolution of the information asymmetry between polluter and stake-
holder (whether that stakeholder is represented by the government or the affected
public) should significantly lower one of the key transaction costs, implying that in
certain cases a disclosure program may result in pollution levels that are closer to
the efficient level. Accordingly, if the information asymmetry plays an important
role in determining pollution outcomes, we should see some shift in these outcomes
once the information asymmetry is reduced. Tietenberg (1998) identifies channels
through which public disclosure may motivate improved environmental performance.
These include output market pressures, input market pressures, judicial pressures,
and regulatory pressures.
Most of the other empirical studies on the impacts of disclosure-based programs
have focused on the developing world. Blackman et al. (2004) surveys managers of
plants participating in an Indonesian disclosure and rating program; their findings
suggest that an important means by which the program spurs abatement is through
improving managerial information. Garćıa et al. (2009) identify characteristics of
Indonesian plants that were more responsive to these same ratings and find that
foreign-owned plants, those in more densely populated areas, and those with low
initial ratings were more responsive, all other things equal. In Chapter 2 of this
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dissertation, I analyze a similar ratings program focusing on pulp and paper mills
in India and find that stand-alone plants, those in wealthier communities, and those
with low initial ratings were more responsive.
One relatively unexplored pathway through which environmental disclosure poli-
cies may affect firm decisions is through more formal regulatory channels. Harring-
ton (1999) points out that under regulatory programs that feature relatively small
maximum penalties, low inspection probabilities, and high costs of compliance, com-
pliance may not be rational. However, Harrington also notes that the firm-regulator
relationship is dynamic and shows that when inspection probabilites vary based on
previous compliance records, compliance can be rational. Decker (2003) continues
this line of inquiry by suggesting that the relationship with a regulator is complex
and multi-dimensional, and consequently, so is the compliance decision. He finds that
waiting times for environmental permits required for plant expansion increase when a
plant’s recent compliance records are poor. Even a brief permitting delay can result
in foregone profits from a plant sitting idle that are a much larger ‘penalty’ than the
administrative fines imposed by the regulator when non-compliance is first found.
There is vast evidence10 that state and federal regulators alike use TRI data for a
variety of reasons, even if there are no explicit penalties associated with the level or
types of releases.
4.3.3 Community Characteristics and Environmental Outcomes
Several studies have uncovered relationships between community characteristics
and environmental outcomes. Pargal and Wheeler (1996) uncover strong support for
their ‘informal regulation’ hypothesis, finding that despite the lack of formal environ-
10For example, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2003) documents more than 40 uses of
TRI data by state and federal regulators and legislators for the purpose of enforcement targeting,
environmental risk assessment, crafting new legislation, and other uses. Decker (2003) also finds
evidence that the time until permit approval under certain environmental statutes is a function of
TRI releases in other facilities owned by that applying firm.
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mental regulation (and prior to the implementation of the disclosure program men-
tioned above), firm-level environmental performance in Indonesia is highly negatively
correlated with income per capita in the surrounding community, ceteris paribus.
Hamilton (1993) finds that existing commercial hazardous waste processing facilities’
likelihood of having planned capacity expansion decreases with county-level voter
turnout measures (a proxy for a county’s propensity for collective action), and that
the probability of planned capacity reductions increases with this same explanatory
variable. Arora and Cason (1999) examine whether community characteristics influ-
ence TRI releases in the early years of the program, and find evidence in support of
a U-shaped environmental Kuznets’ curve, though their results also suggest that any
variation in environmental outcomes due to community characteristics are driven by
Southern states.
This informal regulation hypothesis has been extended in attempts to explain
heterogeneity in the plant-level response to environmental policies and other policies
that result in environmental outcomes, through the inclusion of interaction variables
between the policy variable and variables that reflect community or plant/firm char-
acteristics. These include the second chapter of this dissertation and Garćıa et al.
(2009), discussed in the previous subsection. Delmas et al. (2007) examine the effect
of electricity deregulation, and find that deregulation resulted in a bigger increase in
renewable generation for utilities located in states with higher environmental prefer-
ences (as measured by Congressional voting records of the representatives from those
states). Delmas et al. (2010) look at the effect of fuel mix disclosure policies, which
require electric utilities to disclose the fuel mix of their electricity generation to their
customers. They find that the effects of these programs vary according to how much
of the utility’s customer base is residential; the shift from nuclear to fossil fuels and
clean fuels is more pronounced for those utilities with heavier reliance on residential
customers.
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4.3.4 The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments
Establishment-level micro-data from the Census has previously been used to mea-
sure the effects of more conventional regulation. In particular, a series of papers has
exploited the county-level variation in regulatory status under the 1977 Clean Air Act
Amendments to identify its effects on county-level manufacturing outcomes. Becker
and Henderson (2000) document a shift away from plant births in non-attainment
counties for industries likely to be affected by the non-attainment designation, docu-
menting reductions in plant birth rates of 26-45% in polluting industries. They also
find evidence that regulatory status affected the size of new plants and the timing
of investment. Greenstone (2002) uses Census of Manufactures data to estimate the
effects of regulatory status on employment growth, capital formation, and output
growth in pollution-intensive industries, and finds sizeable negative (though not al-
ways significant) effects on each. List et al. (2003) reinforce the findings in Becker
and Henderson (2000), using a New York State dataset and semi-parametric matching
methods. Becker (2005) shows that heavy emitters of the criteria air pollutants that
were located in non-attainment counties generally had higher air pollution abatement
expenditures, with estimates that imply hundreds of thousands of dollars of additional
annual costs for the average affected plant.
My study furthers the literature on these topics in two key complementary ways.
First, it contributes to the TRI literature by being the first to examine its effects on
manufacturing outcomes, specifically new plant births. Second, it allows for direct
comparisons of this relatively new regulatory approach with previous papers that
have established the effects of more traditional environmental regulations.
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4.4 Data
In my empirical analysis I employ confidential establishment-level micro-data ac-
cessed via the Michigan Research Data Center of the Census Bureau’s Center for
Economic Studies (CES). The primary data sets in use will be the Longitudinal Busi-
ness Database and the Census of Manufactures. I discuss each of these in turn.
4.4.1 The Longitudinal Business Database
The primary data set I employ in this paper is the Longitudinal Business Database
(LBD), built and maintained by researchers at the Center for Economic Studies of
the U.S. Census. The LBD provides longitudinally linked data for all employer (i.e.,
those with paid employees) establishments contained in the Census Bureau’s business
register, the Standard Statistical Establishment List (SSEL), with data dating back
to 1975. This allows researchers to observe all establishment births (and deaths)
beginning in 1976, as well as data on employment, location, industrial activity, and
firm affiliation.
The LBD represents a significant improvement over previous longitudinal datasets
compiled by Census, which suffered from broken longitudinal linkages that led to spu-
rious establishment births and deaths (Jarmin and Miranda, 2002). Previous studies
(Becker and Henderson, 2000; Levinson, 1996) using Census data to look at the effects
of environmental regulation on plant births have focused on the Census of Manufac-
tures (CMF), which provides data on the entire population of U.S. manufacturing
establishments every 5 years. List et al. (2003) have pointed out that this 5-year
window will fail to capture plant births that are born and die within that span of
time. They estimate that this may cause researchers to miss as much as 25% of new
manufacturing plant births.
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4.4.2 The Census of Manufactures
I complement my baseline regressions using data from the Census of Manufactures,
despite this issue with the data. While the CMF is conducted with lower frequency,
the data contained therein is more comprehensive in that it also provides wage and
output data that is not contained in the LBD. In addition to using this dataset to
check the robustness of my results, I also use CMF data (along with data from its
annual sub-sample the Annual Survey of Manufactures) to construct proxies for real
wage rates in the counties being analyzed.
4.4.3 Supplementary Data Sets
I use Toxics Release Inventory Data to construct a county-level treatment variable.
Using TRI data, I replicate the “Top 25” county lists by ranking counties in terms of
their unweighted11 total of on-site land, water, and air releases of all chemicals. I use
these sums to construct an indicator variable that equals 1 if counties are among the
“top 25” in on-site releases. There are thus 400 county-year observations (25 counties
x 16 years); their geographic distribution is given in Figure 4.2. This figure suggests
that there is significant movement in and out of the “top 25” over time, as only a
handful of counties appear in the list 12 times or more. The figure also indicates that
there is a significant amount of geographic heterogeneity among the treated counties;
there are several treated counties in most regions of the country.
I also experiment with using an indicator variable for counties that were in the
top 50 and top 100 for on-site releases, as well as a continuous 0 to 1 measure where
11Toffel and Marshall (2004) suggest that when using TRI data as a measure of organizations’
environmental performance, using one of several databases to weight the TRI chemicals by toxicity
is more appropriate than summing un-weighted releases. However, in my analysis, I argue that the
un-weighted sums are most appropriate, as this is how the data were presented in EPA reports. As a
robustness check, I estimate alternative specifications where the treatment variable is based on sums
of releases weighted by the inverse of the “reportable quantities” established under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, and find (unreported) results similar to those presented in later
sections of the paper.
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Figure 4.2: Geographic Distribution of ‘Top 25 TRI’ treatment
the county with the highest releases in each year is assigned a value of 1 and the
county-level sums are scaled accordingly.12 Note that the Toxics Release Inventory is
generally made available to the public in the spring 2 years after the relevant year; for
example, 1987 data first became available in June 1989. I thus allow my treatment
measure based on year t data to affect births in year t+ 3.13
I also use TRI data to construct sector-level measures of toxic emissions per em-
ployee, where employment data are obtained from the LBD. I use designations from
the EPA Sector Notebook Project to define sectors with similar pollution profiles.14
I use historical nonattainment area designation data from the EPA Green Book in
order to control for traditional regulatory pressure as instituted by the 1977 CAAA.
Finally, I employ data from the Census Bureau’s County and City Data Book series
for county-level demographic data.
I use the EPA Sector Notebook Series to classify manufacturing births into one
12Scaling these measures is necessary because reporting requirements were not constant over time.
Regardless of the measure used, all yield qualitatively similar results.
13I have experimented with allowing the lag to only be two periods instead of 3. The results are
weaker, but generally consistent with those presented here.
14The SIC and NAICS designations, which are commonly used as the boundaries defining an
industry or sector, are typically based on product definitions. The EPA Sector Notebooks combine
4-digit SIC codes whose industrial facilities and environmental issues are similar.
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of 21 sectors. I classify these 21 sectors into two groups on the basis of average
TRI emissions per employee over the period 1988 to 2005,15 which are summarized in
Table 4.1. The 8 dirtiest sectors (non-ferrous metals, agricultural chemicals, inorganic
chemicals, organic chemicals, plastic resins, oil, pulp and paper, and steel) are grouped
in the High-TRI (or “dirty”) group, while the next 13 sectors are grouped together
in a Middle-TRI group.16 I also follow Becker and Henderson (2000) in defining a
Control (or “clean”) group, comprised of several 4-digit SIC industries which are both
(1) non-polluting manufacturing industries that are generally regarded as below the
radar of the EPA and (2) not major suppliers to polluting industries. These include
all apparel industries (all of SIC code 23), mattresses and bedsprings (SIC 2515), and
leather gloves, luggage, and handbags (SIC 315-317).
4.5 Empirical Approach
I perform empirical analysis to estimate the determinants of the pattern of plant
“births” across geographic units. As described above, both the LBD and the CMF
allow researchers to observe how many manufacturing facilities are opened in each
industry in a given geographic location over time. I am interested in estimating a
model of the general form
Bjt = B(Xjt, fj + ejt) (4.1)
where Bjt is the number of births in county j in time t, B(·) is a generic function,
Xjt is a vector of county characteristics including regulatory variables, fj is a county
fixed effect, and ejt is an i.i.d. error term.
15I omit 1987 for reasons described above, though the results are insensitive to its exclusion. I
also check for movement in the relative rankings of the industries over the years, and there is very
little movement - the 8 sectors I classify as dirty are the 8 dirtiest, by TRI releases per employee, in
nearly every year since the TRI was created.
16It could also be argued that there are natural breakpoints between the 4th and 5th sectors, or
between the 7th and 8th sectors. I re-constitute the High-TRI group with 4 sectors and 7 sectors
and report these results in the appropriate section.
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Table 4.1: Sector-level averages of TRI releases per employee
Sector Name SIC codes TRI releases per employee
Non-ferrous metals 333-334 5072.1
Agricultural Chemicals 2873-2879 4361.9
Inorganic Chemicals 2812-2819 3154.9
Organic Chemicals 2861-2869 2648.1
Plastic Resins 2821, 2823-24 1443.0
Petroleum Refineries 2911 1273.9
Pulp and Paper 2611, 2621, 2631 1150.5
Iron and Steel 331 472.8
Pharmaceuticals 2833-34 192.2
Rubber 30 127.0
Metal casting 332, 336 99.5
Automobile manufacturing 371 98.4
Wood Furniture 2511-12, 2517-19, 2521, 2531-2541 89.8
Stone, Clay, and Glass 32 73.0
Fabricated metals 34 56.2
Lumber 24 44.6
Aerospace manufacturing 3721-3728 42.4
Textiles 22 35.3
Shipbuilding and repair 3731 29.5
Electronics 36 27.6
Printing 2711-2782 21.4
Control 23, 2515, 315-317 1.8
Source: author’s calculations from TRI and LBD data. Releases are in pounds per em-
ployee. Sector definitions are from the EPA’s Sector Notebook Series. Based on this data,
I define high-TRI, or dirty, sectors as the first 8 in this table.
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I follow Becker and Henderson (2000) in estimating the conditional poisson model
developed by Hausman et al. (1984). The basic poisson model has a single parameter,
λ, which enters the argument for the probability of observing Bjt births in county j







The conditional poisson model allows λ to vary as a function of Xjt and fj:
λjt = exp(Xjtα + fj) (4.3)
where α is the parameter vector of interest.
Combining equations 4.2 and 4.3 and taking the product over t = 1, ..., T , the
probability of a sequence of births in a county over time is thus











































Rearranging terms, the probability of observing a particular sequence of births over
time within a county, conditional on the total number of births observed in that
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The fixed effect is thus conditioned out of the likelihood, and the estimates are ro-
bust to any time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. The estimation method is thus
inherently robust to a primary source of omitted variable bias, and not needing to
identify a large number of county fixed effects allows for fairly quick convergence.
Counties that have no births over the entire length of the panel in the sector(s) being
analyzed are dropped from the sample, since they contribute no information to the
likelihood. Following Wooldridge (1999), I calculate standard errors that are robust to
violations of the poisson assumption that the conditional mean equals the conditional
variance.17
After constructing the samples discussed in the previous section, I estimate the
conditional poisson model described above. For each specification, I estimate the
model twice; once for the group of High-TRI sectors and once for the control sector
(which forms its own group, of 1 sector). The X vector includes several controls,
which I summarize here.
• MFGEMP is the log of manufacturing employment within the county but
outside the group, lagged one year (I construct this from the LBD). While the
estimation method conditions out all time-invariant observables, it is reasonable
to expect that some of the unobservables will change over a 29-year-panel. This
variable is meant to capture the effect of any time-varying unobservables (such
as market growth, infrastructure improvements, or tax law changes) that would
17In unreported results, I also re-estimate my baseline specifications using conditional negative
binomial models and obtain quantitatively similar results. For the conditional poisson models, I have
also estimated bootstrapped standard errors, which are generally very similar to those reported here.
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make the county more or less attractive to all manufacturing;
• REALWAGE is the log of the real wage rate within the county but outside
the group, lagged one year. I deflate wages using the output price index for
each 4-digit SIC, using the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database by
Bartelsman, Becker, and Gray (available at http://www.nber.org). I then take
a weighted average within each county of the prevailing real wage rate outside
the group being analyzed, and take the natural log.
• NAco, NAo3, NAso2, and NAtsp are indicator variables for non-attainment sta-
tus for carbon monoxide, ozone, sulfur dioxide, and total suspended particulate
matter, respectively. Each equals 1 if the county (in part or in whole) was in
non-attainment for the respective pollutant as of January 1st of that year, and 0
otherwise.18 This allows me to control for any changes in traditional regulatory
status that might have affected plant births in polluting industries.19
• OWNEMP , which I also construct from the LBD, is the log of manufacturing
employment inside the county and inside the group, lagged one year. Plant
births will generally not be independent over time, and may be influenced by
recent growth or expansion in the same sector - we may see agglomeration effects
that encourage entry, or we may see local competitive effects that discourage
entry. High levels of employment (or analogously, a high number of facilities) in
the group of dirty sectors may also dissuade future entry even in the absence of
disclosure, through a “smokestack effect”, as stakeholders will have some noisy
18Non-attainment status is actually decided on July 1st of every year, but I assume that this has
no effect on plant births until the following year. I have experimented without this ‘lag’, and the
results, while weaker, are consistent with those presented here.
19There are two EPA air quality standards that I do not implicitly control for; lead and nitrogen
dioxide. First, only 12 counties have ever exceeded the lead quality standards. Secondly, only four
counties have ever exceeded NO2 standards, and any county-year where the NO2 standards are
not met, the ozone standards are not met either. There are also two standards (total suspended
particulate matter, in 1991 and ozone, in 2004) whose definition changed slightly during the period
under consideration. In both cases, I assume that non-attainment status had the same effect under
the new definition as it did under the old.
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signal of the level of toxic pollution even in the absence of disclosure. This
variable is meant to control for these effects.
• Every regression also includes year dummies, in order to capture any possible
unobserved changes that affect all counties in the estimation, such as macro-
economic shocks or changes in trade policy.
• Several county-level demographic variables are also included in some specifi-
cations, all from the City and County Data Book Series. INCOME is per-
capita income in thousands of year 2000 dollars, UNEMP is the prevailing
unemployment rate (in percentage terms), HIGHSCHOOL is the percent-
age of the county’s population over 25 years of age that has a high school
diploma, POV ERTY is the percentage of the county’s families below the
poverty level, WHITE is the percentage of the county’s population that is
white, and TURNOUT is the percentage of residents who are of voting age
that voted in the most recent presidential election.
Because some of the explanatory variables are based on LBD data (which begins
in 1976) and are lagged one year, my panel begins in 1977. It ends in 2005, the most
recent year of available LBD data. I lose a handful of observations because of missing
county characteristics or wage data, though the vast majority of counties have a full
panel of 29 observations. The number of counties included in each estimation varies
based on the sectors defining that sample.
The Toxics Release Inventory differs from previous forms of environmental regu-
lation, and these differences provide several reasons to suspect that we may not see
the same shifts in plant births. First and foremost, the designation of counties as at-
tainment or non-attainment under the 1977 Amendments was a bright line treatment
- new plants were subject to much stricter controls, in the form of minimum tech-
nology standards, in non-attainment counties. Consequently the cost of entry rose
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much faster in those counties than in others. However, under the TRI, there was no
such clear distinction. The county-level designation arising from the TRI is instead a
listing of the counties with the highest toxic releases.20 Second, even in those counties
that were highlighted as the ‘dirtiest’, local and state regulators were given neither a
mandate to improve this status nor an explicit incentive to do so (such as the with-
holding of federal highway funds, as is the case under the standards established by the
1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act). Third, counties are a fairly blunt measure
of the area that might be affected by toxic releases; most of the anecdotal evidence of
TRI data being used by stakeholders to generate pressure suggests that the spotlight
is typically focused on companies or facilities, rather than all the potential polluters
in a county.21 In fact, Oberholzer-Gee and Mitsunari (2006) suggest that economic
effects of the TRI may be limited to geographic levels much finer than the county. In
short, the change in incentives brought about by the TRI will depend not just on the
county borders, but also on the preferences and reactions of the stakeholders at more
micro-levels within the county - how likely they are to learn from the newly-disclosed
information, and how likely they are to act on it, conditional on having learned of it.
At the same time, the EPA’s regular inclusion of lists of the top U.S. counties for
TRI total releases in its annual public data releases does suggest that, on average,
different counties face differing levels of pressure. These lists could conceivably affect
the decisions of local regulators, in terms of permitting for new entrants. In addition,
any public pressure resulting from the TRI would be expected to be higher, on average,
in counties that appear on this list. Furthermore, this method of developing the
treatment variable has other advantages; it is straightforward to calculate and is
analogous to more traditional regulation and would thus provide estimates that are
directly comparable to those in other studies. At the same time, drilling down to finer
20See, for example, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1989), or subsequent public data
releases.
21This is exacerbated by the fact that counties vary in size significantly.
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levels of geographic detail is not feasible, as the estimation method I choose requires
aggregation at some level, and very few zip codes or even cities will have witnessed
multiple births within my sectors, or even sector groupings, over time.
The limitations of using the county-level treatment variable should bias my esti-
mates of the county-level effects of TRI towards 0. Consequently, using the county-
level treatment measure is a fairly conservative approach.
As described in the literature review above, several studies have suggested that
response to pollution disclosure programs, and environmental outcomes more broadly,
vary with community characteristics, such as income levels, education levels, and voter
turnout. Thus, in some specifications I allow the treatment to vary with the prevailing
levels of certain community characteristics that proxy for a community’s ability to
leverage the new information into pressure on the plant. In any specification where I
include one or more community characteristics interacted with the treatment variable,
I also include the community characteristic by itself to capture its baseline effect.
However, the community characteristics tend to move very slowly, implying that
most of the differences in plant births due to cross-sectional variation in community
characteristics will be captured by the (unidentified) fixed effect - the coefficients on
the baseline community characteristics will thus capture the effect of changes in these
characteristics within a county.
The data set consists of panel data spanning the period between 1977 and 2005.
Summary statistics of the data I employ are provided in Table 4.2, while correlations
between the variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 4.3.
In Table 4.4, I also provide summary statistics on the mean of plant births in the
two samples. It suggests that, in both samples, the treatment group and the control
group are quite different. The High-TRI counties tend to have higher levels of births
in both clean and dirty sectors. However, the empirical analysis helps to identify how
much of this variation is due to other factors, whether observed or unobserved, in
87
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics
Dirty sector sample Control sector sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
NAco 0.055 0.229 0.046 0.209
NAo3 0.173 0.379 0.150 0.357
NAso2 0.023 0.150 0.020 0.139
NAtsp 0.089 0.285 0.076 0.265
MFGEMP 7.927 1.483 7.657 1.580
OWNEMP 3.307 2.867 3.785 2.570
REALWAGE 2.221 0.371 2.179 0.380
UNEMP 6.797 3.490 6.942 3.597
INCOME 13.771 4.198 13.437 4.222
HIGHSCHOOL 66.451 13.995 65.202 14.662
POV ERTY 11.438 6.115 12.203 6.695
WHITE 86.739 14.710 86.431 15.485
TURNOUT 55.854 9.875 55.931 9.935
observations 53906 65599
births 13535 89148
total counties 1927 2382
years 1977-2005 1977-2005
Refer to text for variable definitions. The dirty sector sample is com-
prised of counties that had at least one new plant in any of the 8



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































addition to the treatment. One advantage of the conditional poisson routine is that
it estimates relative, rather than absolute, effects of the treatment, so this difference
in means should be unimportant as long as the treatment has a similar proportional
effect across countries.
4.6 Results
In this section, I present the results of the conditional poisson estimations as
described above.
4.6.1 Main Results
The baseline results are presented in columns 1 of Tables 4.5 and 4.6. First, I
focus on Table 4.5, Column 1, which estimates the effect of being a known high-TRI
county on the number of births in the eight dirtiest sectors in the year where the TRI
is expected to have an effect. The coefficient on HighTRI25 indicates that a ‘treated’
county could expect a 9 percent reduction in the number of dirty-plant births. How-
ever, the coefficient is only significant at a p-value of .15. Recall that conditional
poisson estimation conditions out county-level fixed effects and thus effectively re-
moves time-invariant county-level heterogeneity from the estimates, and that I also
include (unreported) year fixed effects in all estimations.22 Thus, the results pre-
sented here are akin to those from a differences-in-differences type procedure - the
9 percent reduction is net of any macro-level variation, and reflects changes within
treated counties that did not occur in non-treated counties.
Nonetheless, it’s possible that the treatment may have coincided with a decrease
22Theoretical results have shown that inclusion of indicator-type fixed effects in non-linear estima-
tion routines can lead to bias in the resulting coefficients, in what is called the incidental parameters
problem (see e.g. Neyman and Scott 1948. However, Monte Carlo studies (see Heckman 1981) have
suggested that the bias is minimal for panel data with 8 or more observations per unit. With as
many as 29 observations per unit, any bias in my estimates due to an incidental parameters problem
should be minimal.
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Table 4.5: Conditional Poisson Estimations of Plant Births in the 8 Dirtiest Sectors
1 2 3 4 5 6
NAco 0.0148 0.0040 0.0158 0.0093 0.0153 0.0088
[0.0462] [0.0447] [0.0463] [0.0453] [0.0463] [0.0459]
NAo3 0.0019 0.0128 0.0003 0.0053 -0.0010 0.0028
[0.0411] [0.0412] [0.0413] [0.0412] [0.0410] [0.0407]
NAso2 0.0682 0.0719 0.0673 0.0693 0.0690 0.0713
[0.0869] [0.0857] [0.0872] [0.0871] [0.0866] [0.0868]
NAtsp -0.0125 -0.0201 -0.0115 -0.0158 -0.0100 -0.0123
[0.0449] [0.0417] [0.0462] [0.0453] [0.0454] [0.0448]
MFGEMP 0.309*** 0.306*** 0.309*** 0.306*** 0.304*** 0.301***
[0.0468] [0.0469] [0.0468] [0.0468] [0.0467] [0.0466]
REALWAGE -0.0011 0.0055 -0.0018 0.0037 -0.0042 -0.0003
[0.0385] [0.0392] [0.0385] [0.0392] [0.0383] [0.0389]
OWNEMP -0.105*** -0.106*** -0.105*** -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.107***
[0.0129] [0.0128] [0.0129] [0.0128] [0.0129] [0.0129]
HighTRI25 -0.0897 1.250***
[0.0611] [0.334]
INCOME -0.0075 -0.0070 -0.0068
[0.00792] [0.00800] [0.00804]








HighTRI100 ∗ INCOME -0.0211*
[0.0117]
Observations 53906 53906 53906 53906 53906 53906
Number of counties 1927 1927 1927 1927 1927 1927
pseudo R-squared 0.087 0.094 0.085 0.086 0.088 0.090
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Robust standard errors in brackets. Year fixed effects are included in all specifications.
Sample includes a total of 13535 births.
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Table 4.6: Conditional Poisson Estimations of Plant Births in the Control Industries
1 2 3 4 5 6
NAco 0.0971 0.0718 0.0966 0.0696 0.0817 0.0616
[0.0636] [0.0533] [0.0624] [0.0522] [0.0579] [0.0513]
NAo3 0.0552 0.0633 0.0548 0.0636 0.0502 0.0562
[0.0831] [0.0868] [0.0824] [0.0859] [0.0792] [0.0807]
NAso2 -0.0960** -0.0774* -0.0900** -0.0764* -0.0762* -0.0727*
[0.0388] [0.0411] [0.0385] [0.0404] [0.0394] [0.0398]
NAtsp -0.0543 -0.0295 -0.0582 -0.0323 -0.0714 -0.0535
[0.0801] [0.0725] [0.0801] [0.0727] [0.0760] [0.0681]
MFGEMP 0.248*** 0.200** 0.248*** 0.201** 0.255*** 0.217**
[0.0831] [0.0869] [0.0827] [0.0874] [0.0774] [0.0868]
REALWAGE -0.0115 -0.00922 -0.0104 -0.00821 -0.00699 -0.00415
[0.0385] [0.0375] [0.0383] [0.0373] [0.0382] [0.0373]
OWNEMP 0.107*** 0.0991*** 0.105*** 0.0970*** 0.0949*** 0.0874***
[0.0273] [0.0240] [0.0260] [0.0231] [0.0203] [0.0197]
HighTRI25 0.171*** -1.002***
[0.0345] [0.319]
INCOME -0.0158* -0.0152* -0.0117
[0.0088] [0.0086] [0.0082]








HighTRI100 ∗ INCOME 0.0439***
[0.00810]
Observations 65599 65599 65599 65599 65599 65599
Number of counties 2382 2382 2382 2382 2382 2382
pseudo R-squared 0.639 0.678 0.647 0.677 0.680 0.692
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Robust standard errors in brackets. Year fixed effects are included in all specifications.
Sample comprises 89148 births.
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in general attractiveness of the affected areas to any manufacturing activity. In order
to examine this possibility, I run similar estimations using my control sample of clean
industries. In these new estimations, the dependent variable is the number of births
in any of several industries that have very little pollution (toxic or otherwise) as
described above. The baseline results, presented in Column 1 of Table 4.6, are not
consistent with a general downturn in manufacturing in the treated counties. More
specifically, a county receiving the HighTRI25 treatment could expect a 17% increase
in the number of clean-plant births, a finding that is significant at the 1% level. This
suggests that counties that were in the top 25 in the country for toxic releases saw a
shift in their new manufacturing activity, away from the dirtiest sectors and towards
cleaner industries.
Applying these coefficients to the means in Table 4.4, this suggests that High-TRI
counties would have seen 0.18 more dirty plant births per year and 3.77 fewer clean
plant births per year in the absence of the treatment.
These baseline results mask a significant amount of heterogeneity in the county-
level response to the high-TRI treatment. In column 2 of both Tables 4.5 and 4.6, I
allow the effects of the High-TRI treatment to vary with county levels of per-capita
income. The results are striking. First, I focus on the results in the high-TRI sectors;
the coefficient of -.0723 (which is significant at the 1% level) in Table 4.5 on the
interaction between per capita income and the treatment variable suggests that for
each $1,000 increase in per capita income of the affected counties, the number of
plant births decreases by more than 7%. At the same time, the coefficient of .0588
on the same variable in Table 4.6, also significant at the 1% level, indicates that per
capita income is also an important determinant of the magnitude of this aspect of
the response to the TRI treatment.
Readers may notice that the coefficients on HighTRI25 have reversed signs in both
of the augmented models. However, this is less alarming than it initially appears; the
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proper interpretation of this coefficient is now the expected effect of the treatment
in a county whose per capita income is 0, which is essentially meaningless. But it
does suggest that the shift induced by the High-TRI treatment may be reversed in
poorer counties. Dividing the coefficient on HighTRI25 by the coefficient on the
interaction term suggests that, in fact, the shift in industrial activity is in the other
direction (from clean to dirty) in counties where per capita income levels are below
about $17,000.23 Equally important, this suggests that in richer counties the response
to this High-TRI classification is much stronger than the expected effects reported in
columns 1 and 2 of Table 7.
This reversal may appear to be a curious result; it is not immediately clear why the
revelation of this information would cause more dirty plants and fewer clean plants to
open in dirty counties that are also poor. However, if we consider general equilibrium
effects, there is an intuitive explanation for this result. Presumably, the counties that
earn this dubious honor have some inherent advantages that have led to the arrival
of dirty industries in the first place. The knowledge that a county is particularly
dirty does not change this. However, richer counties that access and leverage this
information become less willing to host (or less attractive to) dirty industry, so new
dirty plants are more likely to land in poorer counties that are (1) still attractive to
dirty industry, and (2) can not afford to be as ‘picky’ about new sources of income.
Above, I provide reasons why defining treatment as being among the top 25 coun-
ties in toxic releases is the most appropriate approach, but one might still argue that
it is a fairly arbitrary measure. Thus, in columns 3-6 of Table 4.5, I repeat the anal-
ysis in columns 1 and 2, except that I use two alternate measures of the treatment:
being among the 50 or 100 dirtiest counties in terms of TRI emissions. The results
are consistent with those discussed above; on average, there is a modest decrease in
dirty plant births, and the magnitude of this decrease depends on per capita income.
23This turning point is $17,289 in Table 4.5 and $17,041 in Table 4.6. All per capita income levels
are expressed in year 2000 dollars.
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For both the “Top 50” and “Top 100” definitions of the treatment, the results are
weaker than for the “Top 25”, and the significance of the results is generally lower,
but this is to be expected if the effects are stronger for those counties with the highest
emissions levels. Similarly, in columns 3-6 of Table 4.6, I repeat the analysis for clean
births, but using these alternate definitions of the treatment. The results are again
very comparable. In separate, unreported regressions I have also used a continuous
measure, and I find qualitatively similar results.
The coefficients of the control variables also yield insights. First, in Table 4.5,
note that none of the coefficients on the non-attainment status variables are signif-
icant. This reflects the fact that the sectors that are the highest polluting in terms
of toxic releases are not always the highest polluting in the criteria pollutants,24 and
suggests that non-attainment status does not in general deter plant entry in highly
toxic industries. The positive and significant coefficient on MFGEMP suggests that
plant births in the dirty sectors are responsive to the same time-varying county traits
that spur growth in other manufacturing sectors. Wages do not play a consistent
role in determining plant births, which is consistent with the fact that most of the
sectors classified as dirty here are capital-intensive and perhaps less sensitive to labor
conditions than other manufacturing. Finally, the negative and significant coefficient
on OWNEMP suggests that there are not aggregation effects in this sector grouping,
and in fact that lagged growth in this group of industries decreases plant births in
the current period. In Table 4.6, the results are fairly similar. One exception is that
non-attainment status in sulfur dioxide is correlated with a decrease in clean plant
births. While never significant, the coefficients on REALWAGE are uniformly nega-
tive, which is consistent with the notion that these sectors tend to be more responsive
24For example, Greenstone (2002), using the same EPA Sector Notebook definition of sectors,
classifies the nonferrous metals sector as a high emitter of carbon monoxide and sulfur dioxide, but
not of total suspended particulates or of the antecedents of ozone, while the organic chemicals sector
is classified as a high emitter only of the antecedents of ozone. As indicated in Table 4.1, these are
two of the dirtiest sectors in terms of toxic releases.
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to wages. Finally, I find evidence of aggregation economies in the clean sector, with
a positive and highly significant coefficient on OWNEMP .
4.6.2 Robustness Checks
Upon examination of Table 4.2, some concern arises that the samples used in
estimation of the results presented in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 are systematically different,
and that these differences may be driving the results. To ensure that this is not the
case, I re-estimate the baseline conditional poisson models, for both dirty and clean
plant births, on a uniform restricted sample. This sample is limited to counties that
had at least one plant birth in each of the three groups - High-TRI, Middle-TRI, and
Control. This limits the sample to 49575 observations in 1747 counties. These results
are presented in Table 4.7, and are virtually identical to the results presented in the
first two columns of Tables 4.5 and 4.6.
As mentioned above, I also re-estimate the models using CMF data. These results
are possibly biased, due to the fact that the CMF misses between 22% and 24% of
plant births, according to the data used here. These results, presented in Table 4.8,
are qualitatively very similar to what I find using the LBD data. The dirty-sector
birth estimations are presented in the first two columns, with the control sector births
in columns 3 and 4. The primary difference is that the baseline coefficient on the
treatment variable (column 1) is smaller in magnitude and less precisely estimated in
the high-TRI sectors, while the baseline coefficient is much higher in the clean sector
estimations (column 3). The income interactions are of the same sign and similar
magnitude.
Examination of Table 4.1 suggests possible alternate cutpoints for the definition
of “dirty” sectors. In particular, the pulp and paper sector has a much higher average
emissions per employee ratio than the iron and steel sector, and the gap between the
organic chemicals and resins sectors is fairly large. In the first two columns of Table
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Table 4.7: Conditional Poisson Estimations of Plant Births, Balanced Sample
dirty births clean births
1 2 3 4
NAco 0.0133 0.00357 0.0978 0.0736
[0.0462] [0.0447] [0.0645] [0.0544]
NAco -0.00115 0.00941 0.0696 0.0767
[0.0411] [0.0412] [0.0837] [0.0875]
NAco 0.0679 0.0712 -0.0979** -0.0803*
[0.0869] [0.0857] [0.0393] [0.0425]
NAco -0.0121 -0.0191 -0.0521 -0.0276
[0.0449] [0.0417] [0.0806] [0.0733]
MFGEMP 0.315*** 0.312*** 0.275*** 0.228**
[0.0486] [0.0486] [0.0866] [0.0948]
REALWAGE 0.000251 0.0058 -0.00289 4.96E-06
[0.0392] [0.0398] [0.0394] [0.0382]
OWNEMP -0.0959*** -0.0967*** 0.130*** 0.121***
[0.0131] [0.0130] [0.0307] [0.0272]
INCOME -0.00613 -0.0150*
[0.00796] [0.00908]
HighTRI25 -0.0846 1.335*** 0.161*** -0.996***
[0.0619] [0.343] [0.0359] [0.323]
HighTRI25 ∗ INCOME -0.0763*** 0.0580***
[0.0177] [0.0159]
Observations 49575 49575 49575 49575
Number of counties 1747 1747 1747 1747
pseudo R-Squared 0.090 0.096 0.656 0.691
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Robust standard errors in brackets. Year fixed effects are included in all spec-
ifications. Columns 1 and 2 include 13202 (high-TRI) births, while columns 3
and 4 include 86459 (control sector) births.
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Table 4.8: Conditional Poisson Estimations Using Census of Manufactures Data
High-TRI sector births Control sector births
1 2 3 4
NAco -0.128*** -0.138*** 0.0771 0.0741
[0.0496] [0.046] [0.0561] [0.0551]
NAo3 0.0175 0.0325 0.101 0.102
[0.0443] [0.0444] [0.0878] [0.0873]
NAso2 0.061 0.0481 -0.100*** -0.0853**
[0.0523] [0.0531] [0.0373] [0.0405]
NAtsp 0.0511 0.0568 -0.0686 -0.0664
[0.0428] [0.0393] [0.0688] [0.06]
MFGEMP 0.231*** 0.224*** 0.356*** 0.356***
[0.0422] [0.0419] [0.0938] [0.0955]
OWNEMP -0.0856*** -0.0862*** 0.0929** 0.0851**
[0.0131] [0.0131] [0.0402] [0.0362]
REALWAGE 0.0562 0.0591 -0.0494*** -0.0475***
[0.0512] [0.0516] [0.0164] [0.0158]
INCOME -0.00877 -0.00695
[0.00908] [0.00979]
HighTRI25 -0.0394 0.984** 0.340*** -0.565*
[0.0829] [0.473] [0.054] [0.312]
HighTRI25 ∗ INCOME -0.0610** 0.0465***
[0.0258] [0.0162]
observations 10651 10651 14435 14435
counties 1777 1777 2408 2408
pseudo R-squared 0.196 0.220 0.730 0.740
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Robust standard errors in brackets. Year fixed effects are included in all spec-
ifications. Columns 1 and 2 include 10121 (high-TRI) births, while columns 3
and 4 include 67981 (control sector) births.
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4.9, I present the coefficients of interest from conditional poisson estimations where
the outcome variable is births in high-TRI sectors, under the respective alternate
definitions. The samples have also been adjusted accordingly, omitting counties that
saw no births in the relevant sectors over the 29 years of the panel. The results are
very similar to the baseline results presented above.
While the baseline results presented in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 provide an overview
of the effects of this High-TRI treatment on the affected manufacturing sectors, it
doesn’t tell us anything about how the TRI impacted individual sectors. Thus, in
the remaining columns of Table 4.9, I present the key coefficients from analogous
estimations, but where the count of births is sector-specific, and the samples are
redefined accordingly. First, note that the general pattern identified in the main
results (a decrease in births, where the magnitude of this decrease is correlated with
county income levels, in sectors with high levels of toxic pollution) is reflected in the
individual sectors. In 5 of the 8 sectors, the expected impact (panel 1) is negative,
though only one coefficient is significant. Furthermore, in 7 of the 8 sectors, the
negative impact is increasing in income levels, and the coefficient is significant in 4
of the 7 (see panel 2). However, the estimates are generally less precise, making it
difficult to make any strong conclusions about impacts on specific sectors. There
are exceptions - the impact was fairly pronounced on inorganic chemicals, and to a
certain extent, on the nonferrous metals, plastic resins, and iron and steel sectors.
However, it is worth noting that the treatment did not have the expected effect on
the pulp and paper industry - the signs on both coefficients of interest are reversed,
though neither is significant.
I also run two other robustness checks, though I do not report the results here
due to space considerations. First, I estimate conditional negative binomial models25
25The negative binomial distribution is not subject to the Poisson restriction that the conditional
mean equals the conditional variance. While my use of robust standard errors should address this
over-dispersion concern, I estimate conditional negative binomial specifications as a robustness check.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































that follow the main specification, and the results are qualitatively unchanged. I also
interact the Clean Air Act non-attainment status indicators with the treatment of
interest to test whether there are ‘spillovers’ in the sense that the decrease in births
in the affected industries and counties following the introduction of the TRI is driven
by the same counties being in non-attainment. I find no such evidence, and the
coefficients of interest are largely unaffected. The results from these two robustness
checks are available upon request.
4.6.3 Other community characteristics
So far, I have focused on the role of county income levels in explaining the varia-
tion in the effects of the TRI on dirty sector births in the dirtiest counties. However,
as discussed in the literature review, other studies have found significant impacts of
other community characteristics in determining environmental outcomes, both in the
absence and presence of environmental regulation. In this subsection, I discuss the
results from an expanded analysis intended to investigate the importance of other
community characteristics in this particular setting. The estimation results are pre-
sented in Table 4.10.
In column 1, I have repeated the results from column 2 of Table 4.5, for ease of
comparison. In the second column, I present results from a specification that includes
the most recent county-level unemployment figure as well as its interaction with my
treatment variable. The results suggest that any decrease in dirty plant births in
High-TRI counties is mitigated by higher unemployment levels. Column 3 provides
the results from an estimation where the specification in column 1 has been augmented
by the percentage of the county’s population that has received a high school diploma,
as well as its interaction with the treatment variable. The results indicate that any
decrease in dirty plant births following High-TRI designation is also associated with
fixed-effect method. See Allison and Waterman (2002) for details.
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Table 4.10: Effects of Other Community Characteristics
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6
NAco 0.00399 0.000914 0.000219 0.00455 -0.0044 -0.00188
[0.0447] [0.0448] [0.0434] [0.0438] [0.0430] [0.0451]
NAo3 0.0128 0.0167 0.0144 0.0306 0.04 0.0163
[0.0412] [0.0410] [0.0411] [0.0417] [0.0410] [0.0407]
NAso2 0.0719 0.0775 0.0686 0.0609 0.0542 0.0729
[0.0857] [0.0868] [0.0829] [0.0821] [0.0788] [0.0857]
NAtsp -0.0201 -0.0205 -0.0163 -0.0179 -0.00818 -0.0163
[0.0417] [0.0418] [0.0409] [0.0410] [0.0412] [0.0420]
MFGEMP 0.306*** 0.301*** 0.307*** 0.272*** 0.288*** 0.302***
[0.0469] [0.0479] [0.0467] [0.0467] [0.0462] [0.0470]
REALWAGE 0.00545 0.00939 0.0199 0.00936 0.0235 0.00706
[0.0392] [0.0396] [0.0407] [0.0393] [0.0406] [0.0392]
OWNEMP -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.108*** -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.106***
[0.0128] [0.0128] [0.0128] [0.0130] [0.0128] [0.0128]
HighTRI25 1.250*** 0.946** 2.249*** 1.081** 1.472** 1.888**
[0.334] [0.369] [0.700] [0.448] [0.645] [0.747]
INCOME -0.00748 -0.00711 -0.00899 -0.0165** -0.00856 -0.00847
[0.00792] [0.00795] [0.00768] [0.00812] [0.00771] [0.00799]
HighTRI25 ∗ INCOME -0.0723*** -0.0694*** -0.0575*** -0.0681*** -0.0712*** -0.0857***
[0.0173] [0.0169] [0.0163] [0.0167] [0.0207] [0.0232]
UNEMP -0.00671
[0.00655]
















HighTRI25 ∗ TURNOUT -0.00768
[0.00766]
Observations 53906 53906 53906 53906 53906 53906
Number of counties 1927 1927 1927 1927 1927 1927
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Robust standard errors in brackets. Year fixed effects are included in all specifications.
Sample includes a total of 13535 births.
102
the education levels of the affected population.
Columns 4 and 5 present results that are designed to address questions of envi-
ronmental justice. The finding that counties with higher levels of income experience
a decrease in dirty-plant births after high pollution levels are revealed, while those
with lower levels of income experience an increase, is consistent with the classic envi-
ronmental justice story - that poor and minority populations bear a disproportionate
burden of pollution26. In column 4, I present the results from a conditional pois-
son estimation that includes the percentage of the county’s population that is below
the poverty line and its interaction with the treatment variable, while the results in
column 5 come from a specification that includes the percentage of the population
that is white, along with the respective interaction. The baseline effects most likely
are reflective of the correlations with economic development. The coefficients on the
interaction variables, while having signs that are consistent with the environmental
justice story, are insignificant.
Finally, in the last column, I present results from a specification that includes
voter turnout in the most recent presidential election and its interaction with the
treatment indicator. As discussed earlier, some studies (see e.g. Hamilton 1993)
have suggested that location of polluting industrial facilities can be affected by the
county’s propensity for collective action. The resulting coefficient is negative, but not
significant.
4.7 Discussion and Conclusion
Disclosure-based approaches to environmental regulation have proliferated since
the creation and apparent success of the Toxics Release Inventory in the late 1980’s. In
this paper I investigate whether the increased transparency and access to pollution
information engendered by the TRI was adequate to induce polluting entities to
26See for example Brulle and Pellow (2006).
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change their behavior. I find that in counties with high-levels of TRI emissions, the
revelation of this information precipitated a modest decrease in plant births in high-
TRI industries and an increase in plant births in clean industries. This effect varies
significantly across counties, with the effect being much stronger in higher-income
counties, and reversed in low-income counties.
The results of the analysis suggest several lessons relevant to understanding the
effects of disclosure programs. First, it appears that we should only expect county-
wide impacts in those areas that are at the very top of the distribution. The results
are generally mitigated as we move past the “top 25” definition of the treatment.
This of course does not mean that stakeholders outside of the dirtiest counties are
unable to leverage the information in the TRI.
Second, the finding that the response to the treatment is highly variable and
largely context-dependent has a variety of interesting implications. From an effi-
ciency standpoint, this may be a very good thing. The debate over environmental
federalism27 has centered on the fact that the marginal costs of pollution and the
marginal benefits from the industrial activity that generates that pollution are prob-
ably very heterogeneous across (and even within) jurisdictions, and imposition of
uniform standards (as is done under the Clean Air Act Amendments) probably leads
to inefficiencies. A disclosure program, on the other hand, decentralizes the pol-
lution ‘allocation’ process, putting more control into the hands of local regulators,
stakeholders, and firms. Dirty counties with lower employment or income levels are
probably more willing to play host to additional polluting plants than those dirty
counties who are already wealthy and near full employment. Of course, this is the
other side of the environmental justice coin; some would argue that more pollution
in poorer communities reflects injustice, not simply the economist’s efficiency gains.
Third, the county-level effects are generally smaller in magnitude than those found
27For example, see Oates (2001).
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in Becker and Henderson (2000). The highest effects I find, for the nonferrous metals
and inorganic chemical sectors, are both smaller and less significant than those they
find in all four of the industries they analyze. Of course, the levels of aggregation are
different, but this comparison is consistent with the intuition that the information-
based approach to environmental regulation is less onerous than the command and
control approach embodied in the Clean Air Act Amendments. To the extent that the
decreased growth of high-pollution manufacturing in affected counties activity repre-
sent ‘costs’ of traditional environmental regulation, the comparison of these studies
suggests that disclosure is less costly.
Unfortunately, the analysis performed does not allow me to make any conclusions
about the process through which the TRI had its main impacts. Local regulators
could be using the information in their permitting decisions, potential entrepreneurs
may be responding to an increased threat of public scrutiny in already-dirty locales, or
local stakeholders could be leveraging the information in order to influence these two
groups. Clearer identification of these channels presents an obvious opportunity for
future research – one that could inform our understanding of firm self-regulation, firm
location decisions, collective action processes, and the firm-regulator relationship.
This paper has focused only on plant births. While, as previously discussed, this
may well be the most likely industrial outcome to be impacted by environmental
regulation, the effect of disclosure on outcomes relevant to incumbents, such as in-
vestment, changes in the production process, productivity, and plant closings, is also
key to any evaluation of the relative merits of disclosure-based policies, and presents
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